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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis explores how the training of poll workers in general, and their 
technology training specifically, could be improved to enhance the voter experience and 
increase voter confidence in the election process. To this end, interviews were conducted 
with poll-worker trainers from counties small and large, as well as a focus group 
convened to gain perspective on the training experience from first-time poll workers who 
served during the November 2020 presidential election. The interviews and focus groups 
showed that while significant effort goes into training poll workers, the average training 
amounts to less than four hours, and training for technology presents an increasing 
challenge to those delivering training and those using the technology or introducing it to 
the voter. Due to a high sense of civic duty and responsibility, poll workers showed 
significant interest and used extra time and training materials when made available. 
Therefore, this thesis recommends creating additional training materials, along with a 
program for recognizing those who take advantage of them. This additional training will 
raise poll-worker competency with procedures and technology, ultimately improving 
voter experiences at the polls and combating the erosion of voter confidence. 
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The United States of America has enjoyed a largely peaceful history of transitions 
of power since the first presidential election in 1789.1 This 230-year history is owed, in 
part, to the electorate’s acceptance of the election outcomes that have transpired. Voter 
confidence—the measure of the collective trust of the voters in both the system of elections 
and the outcomes it produces—has been more heavily studied since the legal challenges 
that overshadowed the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. According to a 2016 
Gallup poll, when a sample of Americans were asked whether they had confidence in the 
honesty of elections in the United States, fewer than a third replied yes.2 In the years that 
followed, leading up to the 2020 election, that number slipped even further, matching the 
all-time low on record since 2000.3 
The path to addressing voter confidence requires an understanding of the 
components that either contribute to or erode its existence. To that end, a review of the 
literature in this space was conducted to identify these contributing factors, both external 
and internal. External factors include the social media landscape, as well as both 
international and domestic influences that are constantly evolving. Internal factors focus 
more on policies and procedures, as well as people who either implement or train others to 
execute these procedures. Among these individuals, poll workers represent the single 
greatest factor, as they significantly outnumber professional or full-time election staff in 
 
1 D. Jason Berggren, “Presidential Election of 1789,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon, accessed 
January 9, 2021, http://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/
presidential-election-of-1789/. 
2 Justin McCarthy and John Clifton, “Update: Americans’ Confidence in Voting, Election,” Gallup, 
November 1, 2016, https://news.gallup.com/poll/196976/update-americans-confidence-voting-election.
aspx. 
3 Justin McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election Matches Record Low,” Gallup, October 
8, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx. 
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most jurisdictions where in-person election-day voting takes place at polling locations.4 Of 
interest to this thesis is whether improvements in the training of these poll workers, 
including training to use technology on election day, could improve poll-worker 
competency and aid in combatting the erosion of voter confidence. 
Among the research on poll workers, scholars have debated which factors matter 
most—the procedures used, the personnel applying those procedures, or the voter 
experience that results from them.5 Perhaps the most compelling argument is one that 
likens the role of a poll worker to that of a customer service agent in a consumer setting.6 
By connecting voter confidence to poll-worker competency, Claassen et al. establish a 
foundation from which this project builds.7 This thesis agrees that a chain of variables—
from the correct understanding of procedures to well-trained personnel—contributes to 
positive voter experience and that focusing on that chain as a whole is more effective than 
fixating on a single link in the chain. Simply having the right people without proper training 
or the right procedures without poll-worker understanding will not get the job done. This 
thesis extends on that basis by examining where that process can be improved, specifically 
around poll-worker training. 
The literature on technology implementation in elections, another internal driver, 
provides additional insight through the lenses of both successful and failed 
 
4 Poll workers are temporary, part-time employees, trained before their service in a group setting and 
only for a limited number of hours. In-person, election-day voting is the focus of this thesis, as it is a 
common procedure in states that do not use ballot-by-mail or absentee-type procedures. The author believes 
that this focus provides the greatest opportunity for improving voter confidence because of the accessibility 
of the internal variables involved, most of which are controlled or at least managed by the election 
administrator. 
5 Toby S. James, Comparative Electoral Management: Performance, Networks and Instruments 
(London: Routledge, 2020), https://www.routledge.com/Comparative-Electoral-Management-Performance-
Networks-and-Instruments/James/p/book/9781138682412; Lonna Rae Atkeson and Kyle L. Saunders, “The 
Effect of Election Administration on Voter Confidence: A Local Matter?,” PS: Political Science & Politics 
40, no. 4 (October 2007): 655–60, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096507071041; Bridgett A. King and 
Alicia Barnes, “Descriptive Representation in Election Administration: Poll Workers and Voter 
Confidence,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 18, no. 1 (March 2019): 16–30, https://doi.
org/10.1089/elj.2018.0485. 
6 Ryan L. Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service’: Voter Evaluations of Poll Worker Performance,” 
American Politics Research 36, no. 4 (July 2008): 612–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08319006. 
7 Claassen et al. 
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implementations. Within this space, this thesis leverages two such cases from Iowa in 2016 
and 2020 to provide a comparative analysis of the constraints of time, funding, expertise, 
and contingency planning.8 From this analysis, a set of recommended practices is provided 
for technology implementation, specifically relating to poll-worker training on the use of 
technology or in preparation to educate the public on its use. 
To supplement the gaps found in the literature surrounding potential improvements 
to poll-worker preparation, this author conducted original research through interviews with 
county-level poll-worker trainers. These trainers answered questions about the challenges 
and limitations they faced, resistance they had to overcome, and successes they achieved, 
as well as how those successes could be replicated by others in the space. In addition, a 
focus group was convened, comprising first-time poll workers from the November 2020 
presidential election. The emphasis on “first-time” was meant to zero in on the initial 
training experience, as a typical first-time worker is undifferentiated in the polling location 
from a veteran poll worker. These focus group participants were asked to share their 
successes, failures, misunderstandings, concerns, and overall experience from a training 
perspective and on the day of election. The feedback provided during the interviews and 
focus group led to the following generalized findings and conclusions. 
1. A voter’s experience at the polls has a direct corollary relationship to a 
voter’s confidence in the integrity of the election system; therefore, it is in 
the best interest of the elections community to ensure that those poll 
experiences be as positive as possible. 
2. Poll workers are largely temporary, part-time staff who directly affect a 
voter’s overall experience, either positively or negatively, after an average 
of less than four hours of training time; therefore, the manner and method 
used in training poll workers are crucial in increasing their preparedness. 
 
8 Kim Smiley, “Case Study: Iowa Caucus Results Delay,” ThinkReliability (blog), March 2, 2020, 
https://blog.thinkreliability.com/case-study-iowa-caucus-results-delay; Sara Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 
Caucus App Worked and Everyone Forgot about It,” Vox, February 7, 2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/
2020/2/7/21125078/iowa-caucus-2016-mobile-app-2020. 
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3. Voters who have a greater understanding of the processes of an election 
have less reason to interact at length with poll workers; therefore, voter 
education is a critical component in combatting the erosion of voter 
confidence. 
4. Material for a voter-education campaign would closely resemble a 
campaign to increase poll-worker understanding and preparedness. As 
such, it would be possible to create common media or educational 
material.  
5. Technology is becoming more prominent in polling locations; therefore, 
poll workers must have opportunities to work with the technology well 
before election day.  
6. To voters, first-time poll workers are indistinguishable from their more-
experienced colleagues in an election environment. This lack of visual 
differentiation places less-experienced poll workers at risk of failing to 
meet voter expectations. 
7. Because poll workers sense a high degree of civic duty and desire to do 
the job well, they are more likely to take advantage of additional non-
mandatory training, especially on technology that will be utilized in a 
jurisdiction. 
These conclusions led to the following recommendations: 
1. Engage in additional research in use of online learning modules and 
certification exams for poll workers. 
2. Standardize broadly applicable procedures of election administration. 
3. Recruit a new generation of poll workers with technology familiarity. 
4. Create a voter-education plan that can be utilized for poll-worker training. 
5. Appropriate funding for the purpose of poll-worker training. 
xix 
6. Utilize recommended practices for implementing technology in polling 
locations, including the time to develop, time to troubleshoot, and time to 
train. 
7. Familiarize the public with the technology before its use on election day. 
8. Test poll workers for both comprehension and retention of knowledge. 
9. Design additional resources for up-skilling and acknowledging poll 
workers. 
10. Employ gamification in the poll-worker training process using merit badge 
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Since the first U.S. presidential ballot was cast on Monday, December 15, 1788—
the only such election to date that has spanned two years—the process of elections in the 
United States has been marked by an evolution of both policy and technology.1 One thing 
that has remained constant over the 230 years of America’s practice of democracy, 
however, is that those in power have consistently relinquished the powers inherent to the 
office of president to the newly chosen leader, selected by and for the people, without 
incident. This uniquely democratic surrender to the will of the people is known as the 
peaceful transition of power and stands in stark contrast to the violent coups—military or 
civilian—and turmoil that often go hand in hand with the removal of heads of state by their 
adversaries in other parts of the world. Such a peaceful transition is only possible, however, 
if there is sufficient collective trust in the process for both the inbound and outbound parties 
to accept the results. This collective sentiment of the voters concerning the acceptability of 
an election’s outcome, and their trust in the system used to declare that outcome, is often 
referred to as voter confidence, and both statistics and current events show that it is in 
decline. 
The term “voter confidence” gained broad use in American political discourse and 
began to be more closely evaluated following the highly contested legal challenges that 
decided the result of the 2000 presidential election. According to data collected by Gallup 
polls since that time, American confidence that votes will be counted as cast in a national 
election dropped significantly in 2008, possibly because that presidential election posted 
the highest percentage of voter turnout since 1908—leading to questions about the integrity 
of the voter rolls. The measure of voter confidence recovered only marginally in the years 
since, and pre-election data in October of 2020 showed that respondents’ pessimism had 
 
1 D. Jason Berggren, “Presidential Election of 1789,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon, accessed 
January 9, 2021, http://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/
presidential-election-of-1789/. 
2 
returned to 2008 levels ahead of the 2020 presidential election.2 According to a 2016 
Gallup poll, when a sample of Americans were asked whether they had confidence in the 
honesty of elections in the United States, fewer than a third replied yes—ranking the United 
States 90th among the 112 countries Gallup surveyed that year.3 The point at which low 
voter confidence triggers a failure of U.S. democratic processes is unknown; ostensibly, 
the nation has yet to reach that point given the republic has persisted now for over 230 
years. However, as the events of January 6, 2021, have shown, the nation may be teetering 
perilously close to the edge. As such, if the nation is to uphold and sustain its fragile 
existence, factors driving voter confidence must be clearly identified and models for 
improving voter confidence derived. 
A. ADDRESSING VOTER CONFIDENCE 
In examining the factors that affect voter confidence, election administration seems 
an appropriate first place to look.4 Indeed, Dr. Lonna Rae Atkeson—director of the Center 
for the Study of Voting, Elections, and Democracy at the University of New Mexico—and 
Dr. Kyle L. Saunders—professor of political science at Colorado State University—posit 
that increasing voter confidence in any democratic election system will “strengthen the 
political system” because citizens believe that the office was legitimately obtained.5 For 
 
2 “5 Reasons Why the 2008 Election Is Historic,” U.S. News & World Report, November 5, 2008, 
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/11/05/5-reasons-why-the-2008-election-is-historic; Pew 
Research Center, “Voting Concerns and Confidence,” in Liberal Dems Top Conservative Reps in 
Donations, Activism (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2008), 11–12, https://www.pewresearch.org/
politics/2008/10/23/section-3-voting-concerns-and-confidence/; Justin McCarthy and John Clifton, 
“Update: Americans’ Confidence in Voting, Election,” Gallup, November 1, 2016, https://news.gallup.
com/poll/196976/update-americans-confidence-voting-election.aspx; Justin McCarthy, “Confidence in 
Accuracy of U.S. Election Matches Record Low,” Gallup, October 8, 2020, https://news.gallup.com/poll/
321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx. 
3 McCarthy and Clifton, “Americans’ Confidence.” 
4 Election administration is the collection of processes and procedures whereby elections are run, the 
framework or system in which an election is conducted. 
5 Lonna Rae Atkeson and Kyle L. Saunders, “The Effect of Election Administration on Voter 
Confidence: A Local Matter?,” PS: Political Science & Politics 40, no. 4 (October 2007): 658, https://doi.
org/10.1017/S1049096507071041. Given that elections and election administration are certainly not an 
exclusively American phenomenon, Atkeson and Saunders suggest there is value in reviewing the practices 
of countries whose election confidence scores are higher than those of the United States, especially 
practices that directly contact or affect the individual voter. These practices include voter registration, voter 
check-in, and interactions with poll workers, among others. 
3 
citizens to have confidence in an election system or process, and thus believe that an elected 
office was legitimately obtained, they must have a basic understanding of the system’s 
tools, safeguards, and policies to produce the election result. Therefore, election 
administration technologies used in the presence of electors or directly by electors may 
increase or decrease voter confidence. Because voters often see poll workers, not 
professional election administrators, use this type of technology or guide voters in its use, 
it is imperative to consider how these workers are trained for this task and how these tools 
are deployed.6 
The January 6, 2021, takeover of the U.S. Capitol Building exemplified that 
Americans live in a deeply polarized nation, perhaps almost as divided as in Civil War 
times. To continue the tradition of the peaceful transition of power and thus sustain our 
constitutional republic, this divided electorate must hold that the results of an election are 
accurate and valid. Such an objective is difficult to achieve if poll workers who do not 
understand the technology being used to conduct the election, or the process of the election 
itself, project a lack of confidence or capability to the voter and, thus, erode voter 
confidence.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the training of poll workers in general, and specifically their training in 
the use of technology, be improved to enhance the voter experience and increase voter 
confidence in the election process?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Starting after the recounts triggered by the U.S. presidential election of 2000, the 
term voter confidence found its way both into political discourse and academic research. 
While a significant body of literature discusses voter confidence in the integrity of U.S. 
 
6 Poll workers are temporary, part-time employees, trained before their service in a group setting and 
only for a limited number of hours. Over 60 percent of U.S. poll workers are over the age of 61, with 27 
percent over 70, according to Pew Research Center. Michael Barthel and Galen Stocking, “Older People 
Account for Large Shares of Poll Workers and Voters in U.S. General Elections,” Pew Research Center, 
April 6, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/06/older-people-account-for-large-shares-
of-poll-workers-and-voters-in-u-s-general-elections/. 
4 
elections, it generally falls into one of two larger groups. The first group comprises studies 
and reports that use polling to measure voter confidence after the fact and track its 
movement along a timeline concurrent with an overlay of the events that may have caused 
its ascents and declines. Dominated by reports from research foundations and polling 
organizations such as Pew and Gallup, the purpose of this group of literature is to provide 
a regularly and continually updated dataset along an ever-growing timeline, allowing 
researchers to reflect on and apply historical context to events, view the results of actions 
taken, or see the hindsight impact of situations that occurred. The second group consists of 
literature authored by academics who strive to uncover what constitutes voter confidence, 
get to the root of its creation or erosion, and ultimately recommend how to sustain and 
possibly improve it. It is to this second group that this author hopes to contribute this thesis, 
though not without an understanding of the importance of the first group, for as Winston 
Churchill said in his 1948 address to the House of Commons, “Those who fail to learn from 
history are condemned to repeat it.”7 
1. Chronological and Progressing Datasets  
Gallup and Pew both started recording voter sentiment on the validity of elections 
during the 2004 presidential election, which represents the starting point for graphs shown 
ever since.8 While these surveys may have made minor changes, they generally asked how 
confident voters were that their ballots would be counted as cast. Since the first study of 
elector confidence, high and low points have correlated with specific events on the larger 
U.S. election timeline. As mentioned, the literature shows collectively that a baseline was 
established in 2004 from which the voters’ level of confidence would ascend or decline. 
For example, in 2016, Gallup’s Justin McCarthy and Jon Clifton observed, “Americans’ 
current level of confidence in the accuracy of the vote is also similar to the 59% recorded 
in 2008 but remains lower than what they expressed from 2004 to 2007, when more than 
 
7 “Folger Library—Churchill’s Shakespeare,” International Churchill Society, October 21, 2018, 
https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/in-the-media/churchill-in-the-news/folger-library-churchills-
shakespeare/. 
8 Pew Research Center, “Voting Concerns and Confidence”; McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of 
U.S. Election.” 
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seven in 10 were ‘very’ or ‘somewhat confident.’”9 Similarly, a 2008 Pew Research Center 
report remarks that “voters’ confidence that their own ballots will be counted accurately 
has declined somewhat since 2004,” thus reinforcing this 2004 benchmark.10 
A study by Michael Alvarez and Morgan Llewellyn from the California Institute of 
Technology and Thad Hall from the University of Utah utilized voter turnout statistics to 
illustrate a 2004–2007 climb disrupted by a 2008 presidential race that saw the highest 
percentage of turnout in a U.S. election since 1908—not to mention the most diverse 
electorate in U.S. history.11 In a Pew Research Center report of this same era, the record 
2008 turnout serves as another agreed-upon point on the timeline, one that coincides with 
an apex of the increasing trend in voter confidence. Drew Desilver refers to “the record 
year of 2008” in his 2021 article on turnout as well.12 Notably, these timelines once again 
correlate a high turnout with a drop in voter confidence, affirmed by McCarthy, who states 
that voter confidence in 2020 matched “the low Gallup recorded in 2008.”13 
Likewise, the literature on election measurement data agrees that while party-based 
metrics tend to move in step with the party’s success or failure in obtaining the highest 
office in the land, there was a general upward trend and recovery in voter confidence from 
2008 to 2016, and even on toward 2018’s mid-term elections. For instance, McCarthy’s 
line graph for Gallup shows how confidence varied based on party affiliation and the lines 
flipped with each party’s entrance to office (see Figure 1).14 
 
9 McCarthy and Clifton, “Americans’ Confidence.” 
10 Pew Research Center, “Voting Concerns and Confidence.”  
11 R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Morgan H. Llewellyn, “Are Americans Confident Their 
Ballots Are Counted?,” Journal of Politics 70, no. 3 (July 2008): 754–66; Mark Hugo Lopez and Paul 
Taylor, Dissecting the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History (Washington, DC: Pew Research 
Center, 2009), https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2009/04/30/dissecting-the-2008-electorate-most-
diverse-in-us-history/. 
12 Drew Desilver, “Turnout Soared in 2020 as Nearly Two-Thirds of Eligible U.S. Voters Cast Ballots 
for President,” Pew Research Center, January 28, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/
28/turnout-soared-in-2020-as-nearly-two-thirds-of-eligible-u-s-voters-cast-ballots-for-president/. 
13 McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” 
14 McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” The author notes that the dates of the parties’ 
inflections coincide with President Obama’s arrival in 2008 and departure in 2016. The next intersections 
are in 2017—potentially coinciding with the release of information that the Russian government engaged in 
interference in the 2016 election—and in 2018—when campaigning for 2020 began. 
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Figure 1. Voter Confidence by Party, 2004–202015 
In summary, this first group of literature collectively includes the growing 
chronological dataset within which election participation and confidence, starting with the 
election of 2004, have been and continue to be numerically quantified. If these numerical 
assessments are the “what” or the “how many” of voter confidence, the next group of 
literature is the “why,” as it pertains to factors perceived to drive or erode voter confidence.  
2. Drivers of and Impacts on Voter Confidence 
The literature surrounding drivers of and impacts on voter confidence seems to fall 
into two overlapping subcategories. The first, from government and private-sector 
researchers, details the impacts either successful or failed technology implementations 
have had on voter confidence, along with the impact that social media, a unique form of 
technology, has had on voter confidence. 
 
15 Source: McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” 
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a. Technology 
Among literature pertaining to the influences of technology and social media, of 
interest to this thesis are studies since 2016 that focus on technology implementation or 
consider the impact of social media on voter preferences and political ideology. This 
timeline-driven interest is based on a desire to consider material that coincides 
chronologically with the increased use of social media and technology as a means of 
international interference in the U.S. election process, as uncovered by the intelligence 
community after the 2016 presidential election and declassified in a 2017 report.16 For 
example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said of Russian involvement in the 
2016 election that “this campaign sought to polarize Americans on the basis of societal, 
ideological, and racial differences, provoked real-world events, and was part of a foreign 
government’s covert support of Russia’s favored candidate in the U.S. presidential 
election.”17 Further investigation revealed that social media was a key tool in swaying 
voters during election cycles, as evidenced by CNN’s Donnie O’Sullivan, who reported on 
Facebook’s testimony to the Senate Intelligence Committee: “More than 120 million 
Americans saw content from the Russian troll group, known as the Internet Research 
Agency [on Facebook].”18 This collective body of work clearly agrees on the capacity for 
social media and technology to drive voter confidence as an outside force.  
The influence of technology goes further, however, than just being a medium for 
political ads, international propaganda, and candidate communication. The literature has 
 
16 Office of Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US 
Elections, ICA 2017-01D (Washington, DC: Office of Director of National Intelligence, 2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. Notably, within this set is collective literature 
pertaining to the cybersecurity risks of using technology in the election process and election technology as 
a component of U.S. critical infrastructure. Most prominent in this space is work by both the Cybersecurity 
Infrastructure Security Agency and the intelligence community at large; however, given its sensitive and 
potentially classified nature, material of this sort is discussed in this thesis only at the declassified level. 
17 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference on 
the 2016 U.S. Election [Redacted], vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Senate, 2019), 3, https://www.intelligence.
senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf. 
18 Donie O’Sullivan, “Russian Trolls Created Facebook Events Seen by More than 300,000 Users,” 
CNN, January 26, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/26/media/russia-trolls-facebook-events/index.
html. “Troll” is an internet term for a nefarious individual using a fake account to post inflammatory or 
digressive messages. 
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shown technology as an internal driver within the election process. Case study analysis can 
provide valuable insight into the failure points of technologies used by election 
administrations. For example, in an article analyzing the technology used in the 2020 Iowa 
caucus, Kim Smiley observes that “only 439 of 1,700 precinct leaders transmitted results 
successfully using the new app.”19 Similarly, Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist Matthew 
Rosenberg states in his review of the same event that “there was simply not enough time 
to build the app, test it widely to work out major bugs and then train its users.”20 
Technology has become a key component of elections in many jurisdictions, but 
ultimately, technology is employed by the people who physically administer the election. 
Referred to as election administration, the processes and procedures, people involved, and 
resulting experience of the voters collectively constitute the second subcategory of the 
drivers and impacts area of the literature, as shown in Figure 2.  
 
19 Kim Smiley, “Case Study: Iowa Caucus Results Delay,” ThinkReliability (blog), March 2, 2020, 
https://blog.thinkreliability.com/case-study-iowa-caucus-results-delay. 
20 Matthew Rosenberg et al., “Faulty Iowa App Was Part of Push to Restore Democrats’ Digital Edge,” 




Figure 2. A Visual Representation of the Literature 
b. Election Administration: Procedures, Personnel, and Voter Experience 
In examining the literature on election administration and its connection to voter 
confidence, this author found consistent agreement among the researchers. While the 
individual arguments follow, each researcher concurs that how an election is conducted 
fundamentally affects voter confidence. The researchers diverge, however, on the most 
critical element in driving voter confidence: 1) the procedures used, 2) the people involved, 
or 3) the resulting experience the voter derived from the process.  
Within the first group, Toby James—a professor of politics and public policy at the 
University of East Anglia in Norwich, England—believes strongly about the connection of 
electoral management to voter confidence in election outcomes. He maintains, “Defects in 
electoral management and their widespread reporting can quickly ebb away at public 
confidence in democratic institutions.”21 His framework evaluates electoral management 
quality by comparing the election implementation—how the election is procedurally run—
 
21 Toby S. James, Comparative Electoral Management: Performance, Networks and Instruments 
(London: Routledge, 2020), 13, https://www.routledge.com/Comparative-Electoral-Management-
Performance-Networks-and-Instruments/James/p/book/9781138682412. 
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and stakeholder satisfaction as a measured component between locations.22 In her 2018 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Kellie Wier similarly proposes procedural 
enhancements as a means for “increasing election integrity,” which ostensibly drives voter 
confidence.23 These two researchers represent the so-called procedure line of thought.  
Providing a slightly different approach, political science researchers Atkeson and 
Saunders as well as Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn argue that a voter’s experience with the 
election, not the procedures, is the most valuable driver of perceived election integrity, 
citing things such as the time in line and competency of the workers with whom voters 
interact as more important influences.24 A 2018 review of the literature on voter confidence 
by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Elections Lab echoes this finding in stating 
“little evidence [suggests] that election administration has a direct effect on voter 
confidence,” but rather how voters navigate the voting process drives their confidence in 
it.25 In a book published by Cambridge University, Robert M. Stein and Greg Vonnahme 
zero in on the polling location and its effect on the voter experience. They cite such metrics 
as location, timing, size of the facility, and staffing as factors in voter experience and 
ultimately voter confidence.26 Finally, research by Bridgette King and Alicia Barnes for 
the Election Law Journal indicates that positive interactions with a poll worker increases 
voter confidence in the election process, especially if the poll worker is racially or 
 
22 James, 7, 62. 
23 Kellie Weir, “Safeguarding Democracy: Increasing Election Integrity through Enhanced Voter 
Verification” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2018), 103, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/58274. 
24 Atkeson and Saunders, “The Effect of Election Administration on Voter Confidence”; Alvarez, Hall, 
and Llewellyn, “Are Americans Confident Their Ballots Are Counted?” 
25 MIT Election Lab, “MEDSL Explains: Voter Confidence,” Medium (blog), April 17, 2018, 
https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/medsl-explains-voter-confidence-35279061bfd7. 
26 Presidential electors in the 1788–89 election had been selected by the states from December 15, 
1788, to Jan 10, 1789. By 1792, the process was slated to begin in November. Robert M. Stein and Greg 
Vonnahme, “Polling Place Practices and the Voting Experience,” in The Measure of American Elections, 
ed. Barry C. Burden and Charles Stewart III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 166–87, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107589117. 
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ethnically congruent to the voter, adding a new socio-economic facet to the experience 
equation.27 This line of thinking is termed the “experience approach.” 
The interaction component of King and Barnes’s idea leads to the third body of 
thought, which may well be a subset of the second. The last group of literature argues that 
because people working in the polling location lead the procedures—in other words, 
administrators are the driving force in administering the election—voter confidence is most 
directly connected to human resources—the people involved. In his 2020 dissertation for 
Rice University, Matt Lamb contends, “The effectiveness of the efforts of elections 
administrators to improve the experiences of voters is a worthy endeavor for scholars of 
American politics.”28 He further correlates the voters’ experience at a polling location to 
their confidence in the body conducting the election: “The experience that citizens have at 
those polling places sends a direct signal to the voters regarding the importance the state 
places on their voice.”29 The argument that anchors this camp, however, seems best 
articulated by Ryan Claassen et al. In their article, these researchers suggest that through 
poll workers—acting as agents of the state—voters actually engage with the state on 
election day as they cast a ballot.30 Like King and Barnes, Claassen’s team studied voters’ 
interactions with poll workers, but unlike King and Barnes, who looked at social and racial 
congruency, Claassen et al. examined the voters’ perception of the poll workers’ 
competency.31 Drawing parallels to the similar role played by a customer service agent in 
a retail setting, Claassen et al. maintain that “the voter–poll worker relationship is in many 
respects comparable to the person-to-person interaction of a commercial service 
encounter” in which knowledge and courtesy “can affect the satisfaction the consumer 
 
27 Bridgett A. King and Alicia Barnes, “Descriptive Representation in Election Administration: Poll 
Workers and Voter Confidence,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 18, no. 1 (March 2019): 
16–30, https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2018.0485. 
28 Matt Lamb, “Disparities in Democracy: The Causes and Consequences of Polling Place Practices 
and Conditions” (PhD diss., Rice University, 2020), 61, https://scholarship.rice.edu/handle/1911/109205. 
29 Lamb, 61. 
30 Ryan L. Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service’: Voter Evaluations of Poll Worker Performance,” 
American Politics Research 36, no. 4 (July 2008): 612–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X08319006. 
31 King and Barnes, “Descriptive Representation in Election Administration”; Claassen et al., “‘At 
Your Service.’” 
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expresses with the service encounter and the subsequent behavior of the consumer toward 
the business.”32 By replacing the business in the interaction with the government, and the 
customer service agent with the poll worker, Claassen’s team correlates both the voter’s 
sentiment toward the state or government at large and the voter’s perception of the level of 
care the government will have in accurately counting one’s cast ballot to one’s experience 
at the polls.33 This explanation may be the most concise line drawn to date connecting 
election administration to those responsible for it, through those tasked with execution of 
elections, to the voter, and ultimately to that voter’s confidence in the election as a whole 
(see Figure 3). This group of literature constitutes the “people camp”—the third and final 
subgroup. 
 
32 Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service,’” 617. 
33 Lamb, “Disparities in Democracy.” 
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Figure 3. Pathway to Voter Confidence34 
While researchers in all three subgroups—procedures, experience, and people—
have done extensive work to secure their positions, what seems to be missing from the 
dialogue is the possibility these perspectives may be unopposed and a bridge connecting 
their work simply needs to be constructed. While each camp maintains that procedures, 
experiences, or people drive confidence, none has explored whether enhanced voter 
education on the procedures and technology used in election administration could improve 
voter experience.  
 
34 Adapted from Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service.’” 
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Especially in an election landscape—where voters are unfamiliar with the new 
technologies being deployed—voter education is likely ad hoc and delivered by poll 
workers in response to voters’ questions. At this intersection of two originally separate 
groups, a new though seemingly unintended class of literature may be forming—the nexus 
of election administration and technology. 
3. Election Administration and Technology 
The works of Weir, Atkeson and Saunders, Lamb, King and Barnes, and others 
demonstrate that election administration can influence voter confidence significantly. 
Increasingly, however, an unfamiliarity with the technology used in these administrative 
processes affects the voter’s ability to cast his or her ballot or confidence that the ballot has 
been accurately counted. For instance, Atkeson and Saunders have deemed the equipment 
issues prevalent in the 2000 election “a fiasco,” stating their impacts on voter confidence 
“have brought election administration questions to the forefront of policy making.”35 
These researchers had the prescience to anticipate that election administration, in addition 
to the equipment, would be brought into the spotlight. The accuracy of this prediction is 
made manifest in Kim Smiley’s 2020 writings on the failed Iowa caucus reporting app: 
“The chaos of the process, rather than results, took center stage in the media coverage.”36 
While both writings focus on a piece of technology, they ultimately connect the voter’s 
experience to the administration of the election, demonstrating the nexus between the two 
fields, as shown earlier in Figure 2.  
In the absence of a discussion on voter confidence that traverses voter education 
and better poll-worker preparation, and recognizing that technology and administration are 
overlapping fields of study, a fourth argument has emerged as the hypothesis of this thesis. 
Enhanced poll-worker preparedness leads to increased poll-worker competency, which in 
turn improves both a voter’s interaction with a poll worker and a voter’s comprehension of 
the processes and technological tools used to administer an election, ultimately improving 
that voter’s experience and stemming the documented decline in voter confidence. 
 
35 Atkeson and Saunders, “The Effect of Election Administration on Voter Confidence” 655. 
36 Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
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In summary, within the collection of academic and practitioner writings covering 
the impact of election administration, as well as the writings that intersect the technology 
subsector, this thesis ultimately makes its recommendations. Further, in returning to the 
people camp as a starting point, this thesis examines the role of the poll worker in the larger 
field of election administration, extending the work of Claassen’s team by considering the 
mechanisms and limitations that affect poll-worker preparation to serve the voter. The 
research focuses on expanding the understanding of poll-worker training, with an eye 
toward balancing the risks of technology implementations with the benefits those 
technologies bring to election administration. As such, the following research design was 
proposed and approved by the NPS Institutional Review Board (IRB) for this work under 
protocol #NPS.2021.0039-IR-EP7-A, as a means of developing policy and practice 
recommendations to combat the erosion of voter confidence.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To address the research question posed by this thesis—How can the training of poll 
workers in general, and specifically their training in the use of technology, be improved to 
enhance the voter experience and increase voter confidence in the election process?—I 
focused on gaining insight into the successes and failures experienced by election 
administrators and poll workers in two key areas. First, I examined poll workers’ 
competency and preparedness in general, and how they attained the competency level they 
both believed they had and could demonstrate. This step provided insight into how well 
poll workers understand the process of elections as a whole and whether they are prepared 
to answer voters’ questions about that process, ranging from registration requirements to 
how votes are counted. It was from this area of research that training recommendations 
were developed. The second area related to the technology either seen or used by voters in 
U.S. elections, the processes and timelines for deploying the new technology, and the 
training provided for poll workers beforehand. From this area, recommendations relating 
to practices and implementation timelines were constructed. The investigation into these 
two areas was done with an eye to practice, process, or policy recommendations that might 
improve voter experience and drive an increase in domestic voter confidence. To that end, 
this research included the following steps.  
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The research began with the design of a focus group of 8–10 first-time poll workers 
from a variety of Idaho’s 44 counties who served in the November 2020 general election. 
The aim of the focus group was to better understand poll workers’ perspectives on training 
quality, possible improvements to their preparedness, and issues they were unequipped or 
unprepared to solve. By selecting only first-time poll workers, I could examine more 
accurately the successes or failures of the current training program, especially regarding 
procedural understanding and preparation in using election technology with limited 
exposure to it.  
One might argue that numerous training opportunities over multiple election cycles 
are required to gain proficiency in these areas. While that argument appears sound, it is 
largely negated when a first-time poll worker is indistinguishable from a veteran poll 
worker to voters on election day. The objective, therefore, was to identify gaps in the 
training that limit general understanding and proficiency—on the first pass. The subjects 
for the focus group were recruited according to the process approved by the IRB, using an 
approved email solicitation script and informed consent form. The focus group convened 
over Zoom and was recorded for subsequent reference, and the conversation was prompted 
with the following approved questions: 
1. Discuss a scenario where you felt unprepared to answer a question from a 
voter, or where you believe that your answer reduced that voter’s 
confidence in the process? 
2. What would have better prepared you to answer that question? 
3. What elements of the election process do YOU as a trained poll worker, 
feel uncertain about? 
4. What were some of the most common misperceptions you encountered? 
5. What suggestions would you have to improve poll-worker training, 
especially for first-time poll workers? 
6. What do you want to know before returning to this position again? 
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Next, I conducted interviews with two experienced election training coordinators 
from two differently sized Idaho jurisdictions to determine the challenges they faced in 
preparing hundreds of part-time or temporary employees in a compressed time. By 
selecting subjects from both the largest and smallest ends of the jurisdictional curve, I could 
draw out issues, such as scaling limitations or budget restrictions, that were unique to the 
two differently sized jurisdictions. Similar to the focus group, the interviewees were 
recruited using an IRB-approved script, albeit by phone instead of email. Interested parties 
were likewise provided an informed consent form that they returned to confirm their 
participation, and the interviews were then conducted via Zoom and recorded. While these 
interviews did not provide the exhaustive scale needed for conclusive evidence of all 
challenges facing local jurisdictions, they provided several adequate insights from which 
to shape future recommendations. The topics submitted to the IRB and used during the 
interviews as a means of spurring the conversation included the following:  
1. Problems they have seen with technology rollouts, specifically regarding 
poll workers using technology 
2. Tools or policies to assist them in training at scale  
3. Successes, failures, and barriers to doing their job well 
4. Recommendations for changes to the process or utilization of technology  
A summary of the interviews’ findings follow responses to the focus group questions in 
Chapter IV. A comparative analysis concludes the chapter. 
Finally, in extending and building on the literature, this thesis presents two case 
studies addressing technology implementations in the election ecosystem—specifically, 
the failure of the 2020 Iowa caucus app and the success of the 2016 Iowa bi-partisan caucus 
app. The cases selected were examined with an eye to their rollout procedures and 
pre-release training, with the intent of establishing a set of recommended practices. 
Examples of variables compared included the time from adoption to full implementation 
of the technology; experience of the vendor developing the platform; whether rollouts were 
phased, included a pilot, or resembled a waterfall deployment; the funding available for the 
project, what contingency plans existed, and the success or failure of the implementation. 
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Similarities and differences within the variables were then evaluated to illustrate potential 
impingements to rollout success. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into six chapters. Chapter II addresses voter confidence as 
a construct, examining why it matters and establishing the broader set of events impacting 
the election environment over the last two U.S. presidential election cycles.37 Chapter III 
lays groundwork for practices that drive voter confidence with a focus on election 
administration and technology implementation. Chapter IV relays the results of the 
research conducted for this thesis including focus group data and senior administrator 
interviews. The case studies pertinent to technology implementation practices appear in 
Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI builds on the research with a summary list of key findings 
and the associated conclusions drawn from this project. The chapter also provides a list of 
recommendations resulting from the conclusions and a subsequent list of questions 
developed for future research.  
 
37 This thesis focuses on the last two presidential cycles because the revelation of Russian interference 
followed the 2016 election. Thus, while voter confidence has been tracked as a metric since 2004 by 
polling organizations such as Pew and Gallup, the most dramatic changes in the space occurred with the 
arrival of cybersecurity concerns in late 2016, along with Department of Homeland Security Secretary Jeh 
Johnson’s declaration of elections as U.S. critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017. 
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II. WHY VOTER CONFIDENCE MATTERS 
This chapter establishes the value of examining voter confidence, as well as the 
historical context of elections in the United States as they pertain to sustaining democracy. 
It also examines events that affected the election environment during the writing of this 
thesis as a means of establishing the environment of the 2020 elections and the external 
factors that have contributed to challenges since 2016. An understanding of why voter 
confidence matters and how the United States has gotten where it is today is a necessary 
foundation for Chapter IV, where the discussion turns to drivers of voter confidence. 
Voter confidence as a subject of study is a relatively new phenomenon. While U.S. 
presidential elections date back to 1788—a track record of more than 230 years—voter 
confidence as a term finds its origins in a much more recent committee report from the 
National Commission on Federal Election Reform in August 2001. The commission 
observed how the faith of Americans in the legitimacy of U.S. electoral processes had been 
shaken by the prolonged Florida litigation following the 2000 presidential election, not to 
mention the irregularities, procedural failures, and policy loopholes that the court cases 
exposed.38 Notably, this report was the first of its kind to equate a voter’s faith, or trust, in 
the processes used to determine an electoral outcome with one’s confidence in the validity 
of that outcome. In the years that followed, news outlets and researchers alike would make 
voter confidence part of political lexicon, and organizations like Gallup would begin 
tracking voter confidence as a statistic in ongoing polling. As such, most if not all data on 
U.S. voter confidence go back only a mere 20 years.39 
  
 
38 National Commission on Federal Election Reform, To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral 
Process (Charlottesville: Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, 2001), http://web1.miller
center.org/commissions/comm_2001.pdf. 
39 McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” 
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A. SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY TO RETAIN THE REPUBLIC 
Public confidence in the integrity of the electoral process has independent 
significance, because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic 
process.  
–U.S. Supreme Court, Crawford vs. Marion County, 200840 
Ultimately, one main reason for a discussion on voter confidence is its connection 
to sustaining the process of American democracy and the republic itself. In their book 
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan define 
the processes necessary to consolidate a transitioning democracy. They hold that in the 
absence of these processes, a democracy falls or fails to sustain itself. Moreover, Linz and 
Stepan assert democratic consolidation is impossible until all political parties realize that 
“even in the face of severe political and economic crises,” they and the people recognize 
such conflicts will be settled according to established norms and not through secession or 
attempts to overthrow the existing regime.41 This norm, at least in the United States, has 
to date included a peaceful transition of power following presidential elections.  
If sustaining the democratic process relies even partially on maintaining a smooth 
transition of power following an election, the trust that the electorate has in that election 
process becomes a concern. This is a core tenet of voter confidence and the reason for the 
ongoing focus since its arrival in academic research after the 2000 presidential election. In 
her 2014 book, Pippa Norris argues that the public’s belief in the integrity of an election 
bears heavily on the people’s perception of political legitimacy—yet another argument that 
connects trust or confidence with acceptance of the outcome.42 
While the people’s confidence in the system is critical to their willingness to accept 
the results it provides, the system itself is not the only factor at play. The backdrop against 
which poll workers must execute an election and, thus, shape a voter’s election experience 
 
40 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (Stevens, J. opinion), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/553/181/. 
41 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5. 
42 Pippa Norris, Why Electoral Integrity Matters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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is continually painted by local, regional, and national events surrounding any given election 
cycle. As social media turns regional anti-government events into national movements, the 
challenges facing U.S. elections become more complex, and the public’s trust in the 
government and its processes continue to decay. To better explain the backdrop analogy, 
this thesis analyzes examples of events that illustrate U.S. voters’ general distrust in the 
current system, along with a series of external factors that foster this environment and affect 
the election and the poll workers who administer it. 
B. EVENTS ILLUSTRATING LACK OF CONFIDENCE 
Whether related to issues of foreign interference, security vulnerability, 
interference in the nomination process by the political elites, or just general 
frustration with an election outcome, the majority of Americans do not have 
confidence in their elections. The recent Iowa Caucuses are an example of 
the types of events that can shake Americans’ faith in the election process 
and the legitimacy of the winners of elections. Institutions and fair processes 
are important in holding society together, and particularly so in this era of 
intense partisanship in the U.S. 
—R. J. Reinhart, Gallup43 
Events in and of themselves are only that—events. In isolation, people can move 
beyond them, but when a sequence of events builds to a critical mass of emotion, it can 
reach a tipping point: “the critical point in a situation, process, or system beyond which a 
significant and often unstoppable effect or change takes place.”44 Where the tipping point 
in voter confidence lies has yet to be found, if we have not reached it already. Nevertheless, 
the following series of events paved a path to the 2020 U.S. presidential election, 
illustrating the most numerically significant decline in American voter confidence this 
century.45  
 
43 R. J. Reinhart, “Faith in Elections in Relatively Short Supply in U.S.,” Gallup, February 13, 2020, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/285608/faith-elections-relatively-short-supply.aspx. 
44 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “tipping point,” accessed July 21, 2021, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/tipping+point. 
45 McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” 
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1. Not My President: Trump v. Clinton, 2016 
The 2016 general presidential election was a landmark among modern elections, as 
it ushered in a new level of uncertainty for the first time in modern era, fueled by the 
candidates themselves. During the third 2016 presidential debate in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
Fox News moderator Chris Wallace asked Donald Trump a question related to the validity 
of the election process. He asked whether Mr. Trump would “absolutely accept the result 
of the election.”46 Not only did Mr. Trump refuse to respond in the affirmative, saying he 
“would have to look at it at the time,” but he also suggested that millions of illicit voters 
were on voter rolls nationally, that the media was corrupt and feeding misinformation to 
the American public, and that the opposing candidate was not legitimately qualified for 
office.47 This seemingly unprecedented tactic attacked the credibility of the opposing 
candidate as well as cast doubt on the legitimacy of the electoral system itself.48  
Earlier during the same debate, the topic of Russian interference was also raised. 
According to a timeline released by the Council of Foreign Relations recapping the events 
surrounding this election (see Figure 4), various reports and documents from the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) had surfaced in July in what became known as the 
Wikileaks scandal.49 The FBI had notified the DNC of a Russian hack on its systems the 
month before. By early October, the U.S. intelligence community had released a report 
confirming Russian interference in the U.S. election, and the FBI had begun an 
investigation into possible collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. When 
Wallace asked Mr. Trump to address these concerns and the validity of the government 
reports, the latter simply said, “Our country has no idea [whether it was the Russians].”50 
Again, this open rejection of the intelligence community and a report it published with 
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nearly unanimous agreement cast a disparaging light on the information surrounding the 
election and, thus, the election’s validity. 
 
Figure 4. Timeline of Russian Links to the 2016 U.S. Election51 
 
51 Source: Masters, “Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election.” 
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With the eventual victory and swearing in of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president 
of the United States, the tide and sentiment of the nation reversed.52 Those who accepted 
Trump’s narrative that Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party had tried to steal the 
presidency or manufacture a victory through election manipulation felt a sense of relief. 
Their candidate had won the electoral votes needed to secure a victory. Those on the other 
side awoke on November 9 to the worst-case scenario—a Trump victory. Alongside the 
Twitter hashtag #PresidentTrump, the phrases #NotMyPresident and #HesNotMyPresident 
skyrocketed to the top of Twitter’s trending list.53 By the Thursday following the election, 
most major news channels reported that protests and demonstrations had broken out across 
the United States in metropolitan areas like New York, Denver, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco—where disappointed Clinton supporters chanted and carried signs 
bearing the phrase “Not MY president.” A protest in Portland grew to over 4,000 
participants and was declared a riot after protestors chanting “we reject the president-elect,” 
broke windows, and started a dumpster fire, leading police to make mass arrests.54 This 
progression of events, leading eventually to aggressive civil disobedience, destruction, and 
an outright rejection of the results of the election by a small group of those participating, 
foreshadowed the polarized election landscape just four years later. 
2. The Rise of Militancy against a Backdrop of COVID and George 
Floyd’s Death, 2020 
Fast-forwarding roughly three and a half years from the events of the 2016 
presidential election, some of the same familiar themes emerged. The presidential 
primaries in May 2020, which would eventually pit President Trump against Democratic 
candidate Joe Biden in the November 2020 general election, were held under the initial 
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phases of what would eventually be declared a national pandemic.55 The first domestic 
case of the novel coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) was declared in Snohomish 
County, Washington, on January 21, 2020.56 This first ripple of the disease would turn into 
a tsunami of disruption for the election community. As counties and eventually whole 
states established quarantine orders, candidates and pundits cast doubt on the process 
adaptations taking place as a result of the pandemic. Of greatest note was the rapid move 
nationally to varied forms of vote-by-mail or absentee voting processes. Some states under 
emergency orders, such as Idaho under Governor Brad Little’s leadership, conducted their 
state legislative primaries in May solely with absentee ballots.57 As a result, candidates, 
including the president, started voicing concern over procedural issues with such a massive 
shift in voting protocols. The president took to Twitter with a tweet in May—“There is no 
way (ZERO!) that Mail-in-ballots will be anything but substantially fraudulent”—a move 
that prompted Twitter to fact-check the president for the first time and include a link to 
additional content refuting his claim below the tweet.58 The combination of COVID 
uncertainty and the president’s ongoing battles with the mainstream media, social media, 
and state governments would set the stage for a highly polarized and divided general 
election.  
On May 25, 2020, a new national issue would appear almost overnight as the result 
of a police arrest in Minneapolis, one that would ultimately affect the upcoming elections. 
George Floyd, a black man, was publicly killed while in police custody. This event and the 
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social media response to it sparked a massive gain in both visibility and influence of a 
movement known as Black Lives Matter (BLM).59 Protests under the banner of BLM, as 
well as a cry to “defund the police,” began appearing in cities across the country, from 
Portland to Scottsdale and Los Angeles to Washington, DC. Seattle BLM protestors even 
took over and occupied a section of the city, declaring it the Capitol Hill Autonomous 
Zone, or “CHAZ,” following the June 8 departure of police in the same area.60 These 
events were so critical because they brought with them almost immediate opposing 
movements under the banners “all lives matter” and “back the blue.” As protestors and 
counter-protestors clashed across the nation—often arriving at events armed to different 
degrees—tensions rose, and polarization increased. Antifa, an anti-fascist movement, 
appeared at many BLM protests. The Not F**ing Around Coalition, an armed, all-black 
militia whose purpose was to “defend black Americans” with recruits in almost every state, 
marched on Stone Mountain, Georgia, and Louisville, Kentucky.61 Most important to this 
thesis, however, is how the timing of the movement/counter-movement narratives 
paralleled the election campaign timeline. Far-right, predominantly white militant 
movements like the Proud Boys and Boogaloo Boys began appearing to counter BLM and 
Antifa protestors.62 Meanwhile, President Trump amplified his narrative that a fraudulent 
election was inevitable, and Biden countered as well. The timing allowed these three 
separate events to merge into a singular political hotbed of far right versus far left, and in 
the resulting chaos—mask versus anti-mask, black lives versus all lives, defund the blue 
versus defend the blue, and voter fraud versus voter confidence—right and wrong appeared 
subjective and disinformation flourished. Amid all these hyper-politicized battles, the 
United States would experience the most atypical election in recent history, and the one 
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with possibly the lowest measure of voter confidence since the statistical tracking of such 
metrics.63 
3. Capitol Incursion, January 6, 2021 
In the wake of the lawsuits contesting the outcome of the election of Joe Biden as 
the 46th president of the United States, the militant group narrative continued to expand as 
Trump once again took to Twitter, announcing the election had been stolen from him by 
the Democratic Party. “We should look at the votes,” claimed one Trump tweet, while 
another declared that “if there’s a problem in the system about authentication [of voter’s 
registrations at check-in], that would seriously affect the ENTIRE ELECTION” (original 
emphasis).64 This ongoing accusation of rampant voter fraud, combined with the 
increasing tensions within the country from frequent armed protests and counter protests, 
led to a gathering of Trump supporters in Washington, DC, for the Save America March 
on January 6, 2020.  
Opening for the president, Trump’s senior campaign advisor, Katrina Pearson, 
again alluded to the inaccuracy of the election results with comments to the crowd such as 
“you put him in the White House not once but twice” and “nobody really believes this crap, 
but hey—there is something going on at the Capitol today.”65 Before President Trump 
even stepped on stage, she made direct allegations of outright election fraud and a lack of 
election integrity: “We want election integrity . . . because we all know . . . that this election 
was severely compromised . . . and they’re about to see us coming.”66 These words 
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preceded the arrival of Amy Kramer, who likewise announced that “sleepy Joe Biden did 
not win this election” before declaring her home state of Georgia corrupt, presumably 
referring to the ongoing dispute of Georgia’s election outcome.67  
When President Trump took the stage, he bashed big tech within the first minute, 
called the media “the biggest problem we have,” used the term “fake news” three times, 
and bracketed his opening remarks with the allegation that “this year they rigged an 
election. They rigged it like they’ve never rigged it before.”68 In the minutes that followed, 
Trump laid out his argument for why he had won his second election, how the numbers 
simply could not have added up the way they had, and how the election was fraudulent, 
corrupt, and “stolen.”69 At one point, he remarked that even third-world countries run 
elections more honestly than the United States.70 In what amounted to a 50-minute speech, 
the president presented his evidence of the fraud he and his legal team had alleged in 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, and across the swing states—ineligible felons, 
non-residents, and deceased voters—making it “the most corrupt election in U.S. history, 
maybe in the world.”71 While President Trump never specifically called on his supporters 
to attack the Capitol or break past police barricades, he did call the election an “egregious 
assault on our democracy” and told them the “fight is just getting started. . . . We must stop 
the steal, and make sure this never happens again.”72 
Approximately an hour after Trump completed his speech at the Ellipse near the 
White House, his supporters gathered en masse at various entrances to the U.S. Capitol 
Building, and at approximately 2:11 p.m. local time, according to various news reports, 
they breeched the police lines and overtook the east and west stairs on the outside of the 
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building. Within another 20 minutes, they were inside the building, and at approximately 
2:44 p.m., there were reports of shots fired in the Capitol.73  
The unfolding of the events of January 6—which some legislators believe deserve 
an investigation by a commission conducted in a manner similar to that following the 
events of 9/11—stands as a stark example of the importance of voter confidence in the 
election process.74 As demonstrated in the 2020 election and evidenced by turmoil that has 
followed other elections around the world, when a significant enough percentage of the 
population believes its votes do not matter and when that group’s beliefs are bolstered by 
those perceived to be credible sources, a seed of revolution can germinate. In these 
environments and as these groups further come together under a common banner, the 
process of a peaceful transition of power can and will be disrupted, often with fatal 
implications to individuals if not to the government of that nation as a whole. If a lack of 
confidence in the integrity of the election is a component of this shift, then that lack of 
confidence, illustrated by the events mentioned above, must be addressed with urgency. 
C. EXTERNAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO EROSION OF 
CONFIDENCE 
Having established an argument for why voter confidence matters, especially in the 
context of the U.S. election ecosystem, the next element for consideration is a review of 
the external forces that have eroded U.S. voter confidence. For the sake of brevity, this 
discussion focuses on the increased visibility and scrutiny of technology being deployed in 
elections, the rapid emergence of misinformation and disinformation campaigns over a 
short time, and the significant influence social media has gained in the election space as a 
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gatekeeper of information distribution.75 Each of these factors is examined though case 
examples, with an emphasis on the resulting change in voter sentiment whenever possible, 
as well as any specific policy changes that can be mapped to that factor.  
1. Increased Visibility and Scrutiny of Technology in Elections  
Following the 2000 election issue in Florida, which was responsible for the 
ubiquitous “hanging chad” moniker, the U.S. Congress passed the Help America Vote Act 
of 2002. With this act came significant funding for states and counties, and with the funding 
came an influx of new computerized systems to aid in the various processes associated 
with elections. From registering voters to creating ballots, to checking in voters at the polls, 
to marking ballots, computers and software rapidly integrated into the election 
infrastructure of almost every jurisdiction in America to some degree.76 As such, according 
to Georgetown University law professor and technology expert Matt Blaze in his 2019 
testimony to Congress, “The integrity and security of our elections are thus inexorably tied 
to the integrity and security of the computers and software that we rely on for these many 
functions.”77 
While many today would agree that elections and the hardware and software that 
run them are inextricably tied, that was not always the case. A case in point was the 
unexpected creation of the Voting Village at a conference known as Def Con in 2017. An 
international hackers conference, Def Con provides interested parties with the opportunity 
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to try their skills at compromising specific pieces of equipment. While the conference has 
existed since 1993, it was not until 2017 that the first election machines arrived on the 
scene. That year, over the course of the conference, all 25 machines were compromised in 
some manner.78 The reports that would follow, both to the U.S. Congress and through the 
media, generated sufficient interest for Voter Village to become a standing part of Def Con 
in 2018 and 2019. In addition to the election equipment being put to the test, other public-
facing aspects of the ecosystem were challenged, and in 2018, according to a USA Today 
article, an 11-year-old hacked a replica of a Florida election results page in under 10 
minutes.79 While debates ensued about whether the hacks on the equipment and website 
replicas were representative of real-world conditions, Def Con’s extensive press coverage 
since 2017 has accelerated the question of election system integrity in the minds of 
American voters. It has also served to put the very real concern of system integrity and 
cybersecurity of elections systems squarely in the scope of U.S. policymakers, as evidenced 
by Voting Village organizer Matt Blaze’s multiple visits to Capitol Hill to testify before 
Congress on the matter.80 The growing attendance at Voter Village by not only hackers 
but also election officials, election product providers, and even agencies of the U.S. 
government, such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Cybersecurity 
Infrastructure Security Agency, and the Election Assistance Commission, also hints at this 
increased engagement.81 All in all, the increased scrutiny of election procedures, 
compounded by inaccurate re-creations of the procedures used in executing an election, 
have become major factors for consideration in combatting the erosion of voter confidence. 
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2. Misinformation, Disinformation, and the Emergence of Fake News 
In her 2017 article on fake news, Claire Wardle clarifies the difference between the 
terms “misinformation” and “disinformation.” Misinformation, says Wardle, is the 
“inadvertent sharing of false information” while disinformation is the “deliberate creation 
and sharing of information known to be false.”82 These two terms are not necessarily new 
in the intelligence and military spaces, where they are used interchangeably with 
propaganda and information warfare, respectively.83 However, their use in U.S. and 
international public discourse, as terms defining online communication, was not ubiquitous 
until 2016.84 Spurred in part by the Russian Internet Research Agency’s interference in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election via Facebook, international events like Brexit, and the 
subsequent revelation of Cambridge Analytica’s role in targeting users in online 
campaigns, social media platforms became a societal object of angst for spreading these 
newly defined forms of content.85 In the aftermath of the 2016 presidential election, Craig 
Silverman compared public exposure to misinformation and disinformation campaigns on 
Facebook to that of news from 19 major media outlets, showing that “top fake election 
news stories” outperformed the real news.86 The graph associated with the article, which 
was shared broadly across social media, truncated the types of campaigns into “fake news” 
(see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Mainstream News versus Fake News on Facebook87 
Now used in two ways—first, as a critique of the mainstream media’s purported 
failure to produce non-biased journalism and, second, as a more generic term for 
problematic content regardless of the content producer—fake news has become an 
undefined component of the public lexicon.88 While its definition may be imprecise, the 
preferred platform for its dissemination—social media—has clearly shown a real influence 
on the population. For example, in staging events on Facebook, Russian trolls placed two 
opposing ideological groups on opposite sides of a street in Houston, as revealed in Senate 
hearings on Russian interference.89 Policymakers and government officials must now 
recognize the role that misinformation and disinformation play not only in communication 
but also in creating intentional conflict between opposing sides of any polarizing issue.  
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With this reality in mind, officials must decide how to respond, given the instigator 
of a volatile event may not even be present. The weaponization of social media platforms 
by those who would manipulate messaging, driven in many ways by the targeting 
opportunities online, has forced the private sector into the role of gatekeeper in the 
information ecosystem of networked media.90 In sum, discerning the validity of media 
content and exposing false content in the current information landscape pose significant 
challenges to voter confidence. 
3. Social Media as a Gatekeeper 
While the content distributed is a point of concern, so too are the actions of those 
who control the platforms and either allow or restrict the spread of that content. According 
to researchers Joan Donovan and Danah Boyd in their article for the American Behavioral 
Scientist, “The transformation of gatekeepers has led an evolution in disinformation and 
misinformation, where the creation and distribution of false and hateful content, as well as 
the mistrust of social institutions, have become significant public issues.”91 This mistrust 
of social institutions—as with voting—and the distribution of false media content are most 
germane to this thesis. Social media platforms have made significant steps in fulfilling their 
gatekeeper role, and while debate over whether they have the right to regulate content 
makes for stimulating intellectual fodder, such discussions are adequately addressed 
elsewhere and are outside the scope of this thesis. What follows are three examples of 
moves made by social media as gatekeepers because of the U.S. election ecosystem at 
large. With these moves, social media platforms have begun to filter the social narrative 
within which voter confidence—and ultimately perceptions of election integrity—rises and 
falls, making these examples relevant to this project. 
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a. Removal of Fake Accounts by Facebook  
After news of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential elections through 
campaigns on Facebook, the social media platform began removing fake accounts that 
trolls had used to post misinformation and spread propaganda.92 In the fourth quarter of 
2017, as a part of its Community Standards Enforcement Program, Facebook shut down 
694 million such accounts, with a total of 1.3 billion in a six-month period.93 While not 
specifically correlated to the elections, Facebook’s account and content removals and the 
public’s acknowledgment thereof reflect a recognition by Facebook of its role as content 
moderator, curator, and gatekeeper. It also shows Facebook’s willingness and capacity to 
act on third-party accounts and content by removing them. With each quarterly Community 
Standards Enforcement Report, Facebook affirms its commitment to moderating content 
of egregious parties. As of 2021, the first quarter of 2020 saw the most removals of fake 
accounts—a staggering 2.19 billion—as shown in Figure 6.94 As evidenced by its actions, 
Facebook has acknowledged its role in the larger ecosystem of election administration and 
is responding by mitigating fraudulent content on its platform. 
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Figure 6. Number of Fake Accounts Removed by Facebook, 
2017–202195 
b. Limitations or Removal of Election-Related Advertising  
While the three most common social media platforms in politics—Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube, which is owned by Google—all have varying policies on what a 
political candidate can and cannot do on their platforms, the common ground is that they 
now have policies.96 Before 2016, political commentary, specifically political 
advertisements, was neither monitored nor restricted. In the years since, each of the 
platforms has gone a separate way. Twitter “globally prohibits the promotion of political 
content” period, as political messaging should be “earned, not bought.”97 Facebook, in 
contrast, requires that those advertising “social issues, elections, or politics” complete a 
registration process, post from an authenticated account, and include a disclosure in the 
 
95 Source: Facebook, “Community Standards Enforcement Report.” 
96 Lata Nott, “Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms,” American Bar Association, June 25, 
2020, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/voting-in-
2020/political-advertising-on-social-media-platforms/. 
97 “Political Content,” Twitter, accessed July 23, 2021, https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-
policies/ads-content-policies/political-content.html. 
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advertisement.98 Finally, YouTube and parent company Google require that users posting 
the ads be verified and political ads show a continuous disclaimer of who is paying for 
them.99 
Where the last two differ, according to Lata Nott of the American Bar Association, 
is in how each handles truth, or rather misinformation, in the ads. Facebook’s head of global 
elections policy, Katie Harbath—after the 2020 Biden campaign’s request to remove an ad 
for casting the candidate in a poor light—is quoted as saying that “in the absence of 
regulation, Facebook and other companies are left to design their own policies. We have 
based ours on the principle that people should be able to hear from those who wish to lead 
them, warts and all, and that what they say should be scrutinized and debated in public.”100 
By contrast, Google’s policies forbid advertisers, political or otherwise, from “mak [ing] a 
false claim.”101 Ironically, according to Nott, the anti-Biden ad was still found on 
YouTube, defended by a Google spokesperson as having made false implications but not 
objectively false statements about the candidate.102 In sum, while progress has been made 
by the major platforms in how they address transparency in election-related advertising, 
the field is yet young and undeveloped.  
c. Twitter’s Ban of Trump’s Authenticated Account 
On January 8, 2021, Twitter announced on its blog that it had permanently banned 
@realDonaldTrump, the authenticated and official account of the president of the United 
States.103 Citing “the risk of further incitement of violence,” the post focuses on two tweets 
made by the president following the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6 and references 
 
98 “Advertising Policies,” Facebook, accessed July 23, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/
restricted_content/disclaimers. 
99 “Advertising Policies Help: Political Content,” Google, accessed July 23, 2021, https://support.
google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595?hl=en#zippy=%2Celection-ads-in-the-united-states%2Cadvertiser-
verification-requirements-for-election-ads-in-the-united-states%2Ctroubleshooter. 
100 Nott, “Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms.” 
101 Nott. 
102 Nott. 
103 “Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump.” 
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the platform’s “glorification of violence” policy as justification for the decision.104 Most 
importantly, Twitter’s action marked the first significant, permanent ban of an elected 
official’s account by a social media platform and may well be the historical pivot point in 
this new arena of content moderation. 
4. Collective Summary of Social Media as a Gatekeeper 
Individually, each of these moves shows an active attempt by social media 
platforms to mitigate the impact of misinformation, disinformation, and fake news content 
on the U.S. electorate. Collectively, however, they also show a progression from post-event 
mitigation to a preemptive protection stance. Again, whether this migration is appropriate 
within the context of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is not a topic of debate 
for this thesis. Nevertheless, these types of decisions by social media platforms influence 
the information available for consumption by voters and form an external factor in the fight 
to combat the erosion of voter confidence.  
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined voter confidence as a means of sustaining the 
democratic process and retaining the republic. Low voter confidence was examined 
through the lens of events that affected the presidential primaries and general election of 
2020, as well as those that transpired thereafter. In this growing arena of distrust, social 
media ascended to its role as the gatekeeper of information for society at large and gained 
incredible influence—the ability to transform a regional event into the birth of a national 
movement through spotlighted exposure and algorithmic suggestions of content to its users. 
Finally, the rise of militancy and social unrest made up a third external factor in the election 
 
104 “Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump.” 
39 
landscape. The next chapter examines the internal factors that research has shown drive 
voter confidence.105  
  
 
105 The phrase “at the polls on election day” is significant in that it denotes this author’s narrow 
application of process in this thesis. Across the country, many states offer various methods of voting, 
including mail-in ballots, absentee voting, and early voting, in addition to election-day casting of ballots at 
a polling location. Because this thesis focuses on the impact a poll worker may have on a voter’s election 
experience, and the ways in which poll-worker training may affect the same, it is necessary to narrow the 
scope to this method of casting a ballot, either on election day or in an early voting scenario like election-
day voting. Similar considerations could be made about the value of increased training for other temporary 
workers in other procedures, such as processing inbound absentee or mail-in ballots, but those instances 
would lack the contact interactions with voters discussed here. Nonetheless, Chapter VI considers these 
areas for additional research. 
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III. DRIVERS OF VOTER CONFIDENCE 
Having established the societal and historical background against which voter 
confidence in elections either erodes or regenerates, this thesis turns to the drivers of voter 
confidence. As visualized by the funnel graphic in Figure 7, this chapter begins by 
examining the experiences of the voting populace as a whole, then narrows to the poll 
workers with whom the voting populace interacts, and finally arrives at the training poll 
workers receive to create the overall voter experience.  
 
Figure 7. Narrowing in on Drivers of Voter Confidence 
A. PROXIMITY AND UNDERSTANDING 
Starting with a look at the largest population, the first consideration is how political 
perceptions and party affiliation affect a voter’s perceived confidence in the process. In 
their working paper, Eric Chang and Nicholas Kerr discuss the connection between a 
voter’s perception of corruption in government and one’s overall political perceptions. The 
researchers consider the insider–outsider positioning based on the respondent’s political 
alignment with the incumbent party. Those who are politically aligned with the incumbent 
perceive a higher degree of confidence and attribute lower levels of corruption to the 
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government than those who are not aligned with the incumbent.106 While this alignment-
driven confidence may seem obvious, it affords an important perspective: those who see 
themselves as part of the in-group, with nearer proximity to an anchoring person or system, 
have higher confidence in the system and rank its adequacy higher than do those who see 
themselves as outsiders. Similarly, research conducted by Gallup discovered that voters 
were more likely to express confidence in the integrity of an election when asked a question 
that placed the focus closest to them.107 For example, individuals who were asked how 
confident they were in the integrity of the election in their precinct indicated greater 
confidence than when they were asked to gauge their confidence in the same election in 
their state. This local confidence is attributed to a greater perceived understanding or 
acceptance of those things in which people have a personal, connected experience.108 In 
other words, the more an individual feels a participant in any given population, the more 
the individual believes one understands the details under which a population operates and 
interacts.  
To this end, a voter’s understanding (perceived or actual) of the processes and 
policies utilized to operate the election should be seen as a driver of voter confidence. 
Further reinforcing this concept, Emily Bacchus, in her research survey of American 
voters, remarks, “When asked to evaluate political practices as corrupt or not, people who 
are more confident in the fairness of their electoral process are generally less concerned 
about corruption, compared with people who are less confident in elections.”109 Thus, 
voter confidence in the process matters when it comes to the perceived integrity of elections 
as a whole.  
 
106 Eric C. C. Chang and Nicholas N. Kerr, “Do Voters Have Different Attitudes toward Corruption?” 
(working paper, Afrobarometer, 2009), 27. 
107 McCarthy, “Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election.” 
108 Atkeson and Saunders, “The Effect of Election Administration on Voter Confidence.” 
109 Emily Beaulieu Bacchus and Carew Boulding, “Corruption Perceptions: Confidence in Elections 
and Evaluations of Clientelism,” Governance (2021), https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12598. 
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B. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
Building on the work of Gallup and Bacchus, which connected one’s understanding 
of the process to confidence, Thad Hall, writes that election administration is “a complex, 
multistage process involving registration, structuring the voting process (which may 
include both in-person and remote voting), and then tabulating and auditing the results.”110 
Hall goes on to say that failing to execute the procedures within these stages equates to 
“maladministration” and results in claims of electoral fraud.111 Such claims are a clear 
indicator of a lack of voter confidence in the integrity of an election. Hall further 
emphasizes that in understanding the potential failure points, an administrator can mitigate 
the possible loss of public confidence that occurs when election administration is not 
successfully implemented.112 
In their work, Atkeson and Saunders, who analyzed the “electoral fiasco” of the 
2000 presidential election, emphasize the failure of election equipment and inconsistent 
application of the policies and processes applied in the administration.113 They argue, as 
does Hall, that an inconsistent voter experience due to poor administration resulted in the 
loss of voter confidence. They also make the connection between full-time government 
officials, who are responsible for an election at the state and county levels, and the poll 
works, who are responsible for the policies, procedures, and equipment used in election: 
Election administrators must work to produce a positive voter experience 
with as much central guidance as possible. Poll workers must be well trained 
so that they appear competent, non-partisan, and helpful to the voter. These 
direct contacts influence voter confidence and poll-worker training is a 
direct function of the time, energy, and effort put forth by the local 
administration officials. Effort in this regard will no doubt reduce conflict 
between voters and poll workers and increase voter confidence.114 
 
110 Thad E. Hall, “Election Administration,” in The Oxford Handbook of Electoral Systems, ed. Erik S. 




113 Atkeson and Saunders, “The Effect of Election Administration on Voter Confidence.” 
114 Atkeson and Saunders. 
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Understanding this connection and the transference of influence that results from it leads 
to the final step in the narrowing process (see Figure 8). It asks, if poll workers are 
ultimately one of the key influencing factors in voter confidence of election integrity, what 
is being done to prepare them for this responsibility? 
 
Figure 8. The Causal Impact of Poll-Worker Training115 
C. POLL-WORKER POLICY AND PROCESS TRAINING 
Given that a poll worker on election day is both the gatekeeper to the ballot for a 
voter and the last person a voter interacts with after marking one’s ballot, a parallel exists 
between the services poll workers provide for a voter and the services salespeople provide 
in the retail service industry.116 This is the premise of the work by Claassen et al. in 
connecting poll-worker performance to voter experience. Claassen et al. observe, “The 
literature on commercial human interaction . . . finds that the quality of training of 
employees is important to how consumers assess the services they receive.”117 By 
conducting surveys of Ohio poll workers, Claassen’s team found a correlation between poll 
workers who had a positive view of the training they had received, positive assessments of 
those poll workers by voters, and overall higher ratings of the experience from voters with 
whom the workers had interacted. They surmise that “the brief relationships forged on 
election day between poll workers and citizens meaningfully affect voters’ confidence.”118 
Hall, Monson, and Patterson’s research corroborates these findings—that the more 
adequately trained poll workers are, the more likely they are to express both confidence 
 
115 Adapted from Barry C. Burden and Jeffrey Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers,” 
Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 14, no. 1 (2015): 38–46, https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2014.
0277. 
116 Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service.’” 
117 Claassen et al., 630. 















and high job satisfaction.119 As voters perceive this confidence, the likelihood of 
evaluating the poll workers favorably increases.120 Finally, they go so far as to say that the 
public’s perception of poll workers is a reasonably accurate predictor of a positive 
experience with the voting process.121  
Claassen et al. expand on this premise by highlighting the extent to which the public 
trusts the technology used in the voting process, a nuance explored in the following 
section.122 This trust is derived in part from the poll workers’ understanding of the 
technology and their ability to guide a voter through its use. Another study, published in 
the Election Law Journal, concludes that “the correlation of voter evaluations of poll 
workers and the quality of the voting experience suggests that effective poll-worker 
training may be an important determinant of voter satisfaction and confidence.”123 Such a 
causal relationship would connect training to competence, competence to increased voter 
confidence in the poll worker’s capability, and capability to an improved voter 
experience.124 The procedural training that poll workers receive, however, is not the sole 
contributing factor in voter confidence. The technology employed and how it is 
implemented are likewise important factors in election administration.  
D. POLL WORKERS AND TECHNOLOGY IN ELECTION 
ADMINISTRATION 
While poll workers can consciously choose their attitude, their approach to a voter, 
their level of knowledge, and even the tone of their voice while speaking, they have no 
choice in the technologies that are deployed in their polling location. That choice, and the 
way the technology rollout is executed, is the responsibility of the election administrator 
 
119 Thad E. Hall, J. Quin Monson, and Kelly D. Patterson, “The Human Dimension of Elections: How 
Poll Workers Shape Public Confidence in Elections,” Political Research Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2009): 507–
22, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912908324870. 
120 Hall, Monson, and Patterson. 
121 Hall, Monson, and Patterson. 
122 Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service.’” 
123 Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers,” 38–46. 
124 Burden and Milyo. 
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or official. Regardless, because the decisions made by these individuals indirectly affect 
the poll worker’s chance of creating a positive voter experience while using the technology, 
the timing of the implementation of new technologies in voting environments and the 
training of poll workers in their operation deserve additional consideration. 
1. Timing of Technology Rollouts 
Depending on the rules of the jurisdiction at the state or even county level in the 
United States, a poll worker who is familiar with a specific process or piece of equipment 
in one county may travel a short distance to a nearby county only to find a completely 
different piece of equipment being used. This lack of uniformity stems from the federalized 
manner in which U.S. elections are administered. With this variable in play, even an 
experienced poll worker may find a technology planned for use in a precinct with which 
they are not familiar. As evidenced by the failed implementation of the Shadow Caucus 
reporting app used by Iowa in the 2020 Democratic primary, where fewer than 25 percent 
of the necessary caucus chairs had time to successfully download and install the app before 
its use, the timing of the rollout is a critical factor.125  
This timing, according to Chuck Swoboda of Marquette University, was one of 
three key failures in the Iowa project. Swoboda remarks, “The Iowa Democratic Party 
attempted to use a new and untested app-based reporting system, named IowaRecorder, 
that due to usage and interface failures forced precinct chairs to submit their results by 
phone or regular mail—causing major delays over the course of several chaotic, 
contentious days.”126 The main stress factor, Swoboda states, was the “rushed process” to 
roll out the app, which left most of the 1,700 intended users without it downloaded on 
caucus night.127 This failure to consider timing led to the second significant failure of the 
 
125 Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
126 Chuck Swoboda, “People, Not Technology, Failed in the 2020 Iowa Caucuses,” Forbes, March 22, 
2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckswoboda/2020/03/22/people-not-technology-failed-in-the-2020-
iowa-caucuses/#5d5c46bb31d0. The 2020 Iowa caucus app is examined in further detail as a case study in 
Chapter V in contrast with a similar app that Iowa successfully utilized in 2016. Because of the further 
examination undertaken in Chapter V, specific details have been omitted here. 
127 Swoboda. 
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project: “inadequate training and coordination.”128 Despite the rushed process and 
inadequate training with a poorly constructed backup plan, Swoboda makes the case for 
continued use of technology in elections: “My point in all this is that the three major 
problems in Iowa were real. But they weren’t caused by technology. They were caused by 
people.”129 In short, a failed implementation plan that left no time for proper training 
illustrates how not to roll out a new technology. 
2. Poll-Worker Technology Training 
When asked what single factor has challenged them most in elections, poll workers 
and poll-worker trainers alike resoundingly cite training on technology.130 According to 
Burden and Milyo, while local election officials rate training as a top priority, “training 
practices do not appear to translate into uniform administration.”131 Nowhere does failure 
to create this uniformity in administration appear a bigger problem than with technology, 
as unlike election law or policy, the technology used in an election could easily vary from 
one election to the next, leaving little time for adequate training. Successful 
implementations, such as Iowa’s 2016 Republican and Democratic primaries or the rollout 
of electronic pollbooks in one large Idaho county, require significant time to allow those 
who use the technology to experiment, interact, and gain familiarity with it.132 In the end, 
this investment in training time provides users with the ability not only to navigate new 
technologies but also to explain their use to others, a process that Burden and Milyo claim 
has a direct connection to voter confidence.133 
In summary, given the direct connection between the use of technology in the 




130 This information was obtained from interviews and focus group research for this thesis. 
131 Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers.” 
132 Sara Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 Caucus App Worked and Everyone Forgot about It,” Vox, February 7, 
2020, https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/7/21125078/iowa-caucus-2016-mobile-app-2020; Poll worker 
trainer from large county, interview with the author, June 4, 2021. See Chapter IV. 
133 Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers.” 
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guide the use of the technology is critical. So, too, is determining what manner of training 
is best received by poll workers for this purpose and what practices have proven valuable 
and effective for poll-worker training coordinators.  
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter considered internal factors in the voting process that ultimately serve 
to drive or erode voter confidence. While party affiliation and proximity to the process are 
among these factors, they merely illustrate that the closer a voter is to the process and the 
greater the voter’s understanding of it, the greater the likelihood of having confidence in 
the process. The chapter also examined election administration, connecting those who 
execute election processes on election day with voter confidence in that election—based 
on interactions with these often-part-time temporary workers. Finally, by comparing the 
role of a poll worker to the role of a customer service agent in a commercial setting, poll-
worker training was brought into the spotlight, as was the technology used in the election 
space. These two elements—poll-worker training and competency in the use of 
technology—may each present an opportunity for improving the voter’s experience and 
ultimately confidence in elections. 
To further understand and define this opportunity, Chapter IV analyzes data 
collected from interviews of poll-worker trainers and a focus group of first-time poll 
workers. It discusses the parameters of the unique research conducted, examines responses 




This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the unique research conducted 
for this project to lend insight beyond what can be gained from the literature. Specifically, 
it details the results of a focus group of first-time poll workers from the November 2020 
presidential election, as well as interviews with two poll-worker trainers from a large and 
small county in Idaho. Convened to examine roadblocks in providing and receiving poll-
worker training, the focus group and interviews were conducted using NPS IRB-approved 
procedures for recruiting, disclosing risk, and providing written informed consent to 
participants. The discussions have been paraphrased generally, with specific quotes 
anonymized for participant confidentiality, according to IRB guidelines. The focus group 
section of this chapter concludes with an analysis and summary of the understanding gained 
from the group discussion. The interviews that follow each include an analysis, as well as 
a comparative analysis in both written and graphical form.  
A. POLL-WORKER FOCUS GROUP 
To understand the first-time poll worker’s perspective on the quality and quantity 
of training to prepare for election day, a focus group of first-time poll workers from various 
Idaho counties was convened over Zoom.134 As a condition of the research, all names and 
locations have been anonymized. This sample of respondents represented a variety of 
jurisdictions, roles, and situations. One small-precinct participant served as the chief judge, 
the person responsible for managing the precinct, and in this case, had a team made up 
almost entirely of first-timers. Another participant served in one of the largest precincts, a 
combination of three precincts in fact, in one of Idaho’s largest counties. The overall roles 
of these eight participants covered a broad range, yet their experiences shared common 
threads, which are analyzed at the end of this section. They were roughly equally divided 
male to female, and their ages ranged from mid-twenties to upper sixties. 
 
134 The use of Zoom video conferencing, which much of society used during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
helped to expand the geographic range from which the focus group and interviews could be conducted. 
Over Zoom, the focus group could include participants from counties around the state both without travel 
costs and without exposing participants to COVID-related risks. 
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The following subsections detail their responses to various questions. Presented as 
first-person narratives, the statements were transcribed and anonymized from the overall 
two-hour discussion. A portion of the responses was submitted by the eighth participant in 
the group by email following the group discussion and incorporated in the appropriate 
locations. This participant could hear the conversation but, due to technical issues and 
signal strength, could not speak during the live call. To re-create a conversational flow, the 
participants’ answers appear within the general sequence of the questions they were 
presented.  
1. What was the extent of the training available to you, or if you’ve 
already heard someone describe your scenario, what was it most 
similar to that we’ve already heard?  
• I had a two-hour training window the week before the election, and four 
days before that training I got a packet to read through. I went to training, 
and we were trained together on two machines and got to look at all the 
paperwork that would be involved in the process. We had a physical copy 
of the log book (pollbook), but we were also using electronic pollbooks. 
We also got an overview of how to handle curb voting, loading data to and 
logging into machines, and other processes—all in two hours. It was well 
organized. Directions were easy to follow, and I always had my packet of 
information to refer back to, which helped significantly. 
• I went in two hours, the Tuesday before the election, and we covered all 
the material, similar to what was just said. 
• I didn’t get a “training” as much as I attended a pre-meeting demo of the 
pollbooks and the check-in process, and a step-by-step on how a voter 
would walk through the different steps on election day. The remainder 
happened on the actual election day and was more focused on my specific 
role. 
• I was similar to [removed], and they also attended the state employee 
backup training, where I got a breakdown of the process of operating an e-
pollbook, but the trainer was excellent at explaining—he was young and 
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understood the technology.135 I spent the first part of the election day at 
my polling location learning on-the-job so to speak. I noticed that 
positions on election day were not necessarily optimized to people’s skills 
or tendencies, like not putting outgoing or confident people in positions 
where they would be interacting the most with the public. 
• I had roughly two hours training provided by my county clerk and the 
elections director. I was assigned to verify addresses, and they had a 
station set up for me. As a result, I went to that station and learned that 
task. That is also where I spent my time on election day, but I knew I 
always had a chief judge I could call on with questions on other parts of 
the process.  
• The training event at our local courthouse and facilitated by our local 
auditor/recorder was very well planned and organized. Our clerk asked 
each volunteer what specific duty that they would like to handle and 
focused individually on the training for that position and/or equipment. 
We were easily given other options if we felt overwhelmed. Then, she 
brought us together for an overall view on procedures and manuals in the 
event we would need to “pinch hit.” 
2. Discuss a scenario where you felt unprepared to answer a question 
from a voter, or where you believe that your answer reduced that 
voter’s confidence in the process.  
• A voter came up to register, and we had an e-pollbook in front of us. I 
asked for ID and scanned it, and it pulled up his information. If the ID did 
not match the voter’s address, I was to ask for a second piece of ID, and 
the first time it happened I selected the “no” response on the pollbook. 
That prompted the machine to say the voter was ineligible to vote. If I 
lived in that community, I could have spoken to the voter’s eligibility, but 
 
135 In the week before the November election, Idaho recruited a large number of state employees and 
provided an emergency training session for them when officials realized many counties would be short poll 
workers due to last-minute COVID-19 infections and testing. This effort augmented county trainings and 
represented the last opportunity to train workers before the election.  
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I was working out of my community. As such, I had to call over a chief 
judge and start over. I was told to respond that they had provided the 
evidence when in fact they had not. It left me uncomfortable with having 
broken the oath I took. When I took a break, I watched several people 
simply bypass the evidence component and pass the voter on with a “yes.” 
This process wasn’t covered during training. 
• Alternatively, we simply put it back on the voter in my precinct, and they 
went and got the additional information needed before we approved them 
to move on. 
• Language barriers were also a challenge in my district, and the voters were 
unsure what questions were actually being asked of them because we had 
no one who spoke Spanish. 
• I felt ill prepared to deal with the technology aspect of it—we had two 
machines for ballots to scan into, but occasionally one worked and one 
didn’t. Voters also felt concerned that even though they saw that a ballot 
went into a tabulator, how did they know that it was actually counted in 
the total? 
• Curbside voting—we had people that were assisting people outside voting, 
but there is no necessary manner for a person at the curb to know that their 
ballot made it back to the actual tabulator. I didn’t know how to answer 
their concern. 
3. What elements of the election process do YOU as a trained poll worker 
feel uncertain about? 
• Everyone in my precinct save one was new—while that avoided any 
entrenched practices, it also didn’t leave us with a track record to rely on. 
Midday, because of an e-pollbook issue, we received a second manual 
pollbook and were off by one voter on our count reconciling later in the 
night. We were unprepared for what to do when something goes wrong. 
53 
• Spoiled ballots were something that I didn’t feel we covered or covered 
well in training, so it caught me off guard when the first discussion of 
“spoiling” came up.136 
• I felt unprepared in all regards to start, but now I only really know one 
aspect of what I saw and worked on that day. I don’t have a high comfort 
level in necessarily any areas. 
• During my 20-minute break mentioned earlier, I forgot to log out of my 
pollbook, and when I returned, the chief judge was on my pollbook using 
it in my login. I got in a hurry and blew past protocols like logging out, 
and don’t think we covered security enough. 
• I felt very prepared as a first-time poll worker because of the training I 
received, but most importantly, I want to add that there were no voter 
issues that arose that were not handled tactfully and professionally by the 
chief judge. 
4. What are you confident about because of the training you received? 
• I believe we received adequate training, but we were not necessarily 
trained to do the jobs we would eventually do.  
• Knowing that we had the clerk’s phone number as a sort of hotline 
fallback was good for my confidence as a chief judge. We were all 
depending on each other’s recollections. 
• I had extreme confidence in our clerk that was always available for us to 
escalate issues if we needed it. 
• At the polling place, the flow of the process was well thought out. COVID 
measures were well explained in signage and reiterated by volunteers, so I 
thought we did that well. I was able to assist with individuals utilizing the 
 
136 Spoiling of a ballot is a process by which an improperly or erroneously voted, mismarked, or 
damaged ballot is labeled so as not to be counted yet retained as a component of a ballot inventory system 
before a new ballot is issued to a voter. Proper spoiling of ballots ensures that audit trails for ballot counts 
are maintained. 
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curbside voting as well as manning the electronic polling booth, and I was 
comfortable with my knowledge as a first-time poll worker. 
• One of the things I quickly learned is that I came across a lot of types of 
voters, and I felt comfortable teaching them how to feed the machine. I 
could handle that and directed them manually on how to do that correctly. 
The human touch aspect was important. There are a lot of levels of voter 
knowledge with the processes, and varied experience there. 
• Interaction with the voter was the most enjoyable part for me as we waited 
for a booth to open up for them. We had conversations, and I asked them 
questions. The human connection was a key factor that would bring me 
back. 
• It was gratifying to see the civic engagement taking place, and I 
appreciated being able to participate.  
5. Would you do it again (go through training in order to work as a poll 
worker)? 
• I would sit through the training again, even given the 14 hours that I spent 
on the election day working. It was a long day, but I will continue to 
invest the time in training because election day made it worth it. 
• I didn’t even know that we were getting paid. I’d still do it without the 
check. The only criticism I have is that it is such a long day. There was no 
cover for breaks. I stayed busy the whole time. We needed more staffing 
as I had no time to eat. 
• I had several voters come up to me to say thank you. That’s amazing. It’s 
a duty that we are fulfilling, but it’s also fulfilling to be able to perform 
that duty on behalf of the voters. I’m in for another election, yes. 
• We had a dedicated substitute there to make sure that the scenario just 
mentioned (no break time) didn’t happen. We had a much more laid-back 
environment, and everyone had time for breaks, food, and whatnot. 
6. What were some of the most common misperceptions you encountered? 
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• Understanding of under-voting or over-voting—people asked, do I have to 
vote for this race for the ballot to count? 
• The way that a particular county does it is not the way that all counties do 
it. I think most people think that the way they vote in their precinct is how 
it is done statewide. 
• Some people were bringing in a ballot that had been mailed to them that 
they “didn’t request.” I don’t know if that was a mistake in the system or if 
they just forgot, but they just thought everyone got a ballot mailed to 
them. 
• I think there are a lot of misunderstandings about voting by mail and voter 
fraud by mail versus absentee voting. People had the idea that the county 
didn’t know who got a ballot or who it came from. Also, people think 
vote-by-mail and absentee voting are the same thing. 
• The only issue that I would mention is that people would come to the 
polling place with their requested mailed ballot in hand. We could not 
accept them, and that seemed to perplex people, but they seemed satisfied 
that they could vote in person and witness the spoiling of the mailed 
ballot. 
• Another concern that I heard from a few of the voters was around the 
authenticity of their signature. Some felt that as their signature changed 
due to age-related ability to write or preferences in script, that their 
absentee ballot would be rejected. 
7. What suggestions would you have to improve poll-worker training, 
especially for first-time poll workers? 
• Change the training by splitting it up—one section more specifically 
oriented for machines and another for the pitfalls that can happen and how 
to solve them. We could do different scenario-based training on how a 
voter moves through a precinct. Also, we get too much at once—you have 
to throw out the first idea in your brain to make room for the eleventh.  
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• Because I was trained for a position, I felt comfortable where I was 
stationed but would not have felt comfortable in another position. I feel 
like position-specific trainings are helpful, but could we access more of 
them to be able to be more valuable or more flexible? 
8. What do you want to know before returning to this position again? How 
likely would you complete “homework” if it were given to you, and how 
much time would you commit annually to that? 
• I did not volunteer to be the chief judge either time. I was just told that is 
where I was needed. I don’t normally get involved in politics, but this is 
fun. If we had the two-hour training plus the more detailed pieces, it 
would stick with me longer. I think testing for understanding is fully 
reasonable. 
• I think testing/homework is a great idea, and there is no such thing as too 
much information, just too much information in too short a time. For those 
familiar with the process, they could always bypass the information they 
don’t need to see if they can “test out.” Any training I can get, I’m all over 
it. 
• Quizzes are given to see both how much someone knows and how well a 
subject is taught. It can gauge both ends of the spectrum. I would watch 
videos all the time if they were available, and I think that videos are a 
great means of communicating with both visual and hearing-based 
learners. 
• I enjoyed it, and it wouldn’t take much for me to come back. There is so 
much to learn, and I am excited about the process. I’d be willing to do 
more take home than I did, especially at a four-hour-or-less level. 
• I think all aspects of learning and all learning types should be leveraged 
when possible. I would have no resistance to additional training. The more 
the merrier. 
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• The more we are equipped as poll workers, the more we are able to make 
the vote happen for people. I don’t think you can be over-equipped for 
this. 
9. Do you have any final thoughts to add? 
• Since we serve on jury duty and we do it regularly, why not be 
“voluntold” to be poll workers? I had never considered working until I 
was asked by a personal friend. It’s not as hard as one might think. 
• Could we use public service announcements for poll-worker recruitment? 
Should someone create a video ad that can play there? 
• I appreciate being a part of the process now. Having done it once, I’ll be 
up to doing it again, but no matter the format the training ultimately takes, 
we should be encouraging anyone interested in participating as a poll 
worker to look at the training in advance, which means making it available 
in advance. 
• Could we develop a type of scenario-based training, like the alternate 
ending books, for a poll worker that covers the voting process? That way 
the poll worker could walk through the different interactive decisions that 
could play out. 
• A small community, even with an active pandemic and a volatile election 
year, will view the privilege of casting a vote as an American tradition and 
act appropriately. 
10.  Additional Commentary from Focus Group Leader 
Based on the answers by the midpoint of the focus group, I wanted to gauge, 
through a scenario-based question, whether the poll workers’ training gave them the 
procedural understanding of how a voter could be challenged.137 Consistent with the IRB-
 
137 The process known as challenging a voter is a procedure by which someone designated by a chief 
judge or election official as a challenger for a polling location can contest the qualifications of a voter to 
receive a ballot. Upon the issuance of a challenge, different states have varied procedures by which a 
challenged voter may proceed, either with a provisional ballot or by signing an affidavit, for example. 
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approved process of using the questions as discussion starters, the scenario proposed was 
an uncommon event in most precincts but one that did have a specific procedure to follow.  
I first asked whether they were comfortable with how to handle a challenged voter 
at the pollbook. At the time of the question, there were six people on the line. Two 
responded that they were comfortable while four responded that they were not. I then asked 
the question through a scenario—What would you do if a challenge happened once the 
ballot had been placed in the tabulator? With this scenario, all four “no” respondents still 
said no but did not recognize that I had asked an unreasonable question, as the voter can 
only be challenged at the start of the process and not at the end. One of the two “yes” 
respondents picked up on the issue that one cannot challenge a voter past the check-in 
phase while the other did not remember ever being trained on that scenario but could not 
come up with a reason to allow or deny it.  
B. FOCUS GROUP ANALYSIS 
Poll-worker training varies greatly and is not necessarily related to the size of the 
county performing it. In fact, the lower turnover and smaller training numbers typically 
found in smaller jurisdictions lead to more intimate, more tailored trainings for first-time 
individuals. Training materials are often used to supplement the approximately two-hour 
to two-and-a-half-hour training schedule, assigned in advance to be reviewed before the 
training for familiarization. 
The part-time nature of the positions that poll workers fill is not a limiting factor 
when it comes to the amount of training they are willing to undergo to serve. A sense of 
civic duty and personal pride appears to override the time or return on investment that one 
might typically associate with training for a paid position. While participants on average 
did not identify a sense of under-preparedness, their confidence often relied more on 
knowing where to go to get the answer than on knowing an answer. Because of the 
motivating factors of duty, accuracy, and importance of role, participants voiced a high 
commitment to self-education, including but not limited to several hours of at-home 
training and material review before formal training. 
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Poll workers have a high proclaimed confidence in their knowledge of procedures; 
however, based on having only one of six participants answer the scenario-specific 
question correctly, they may over-appraise their knowledge when self-reporting without a 
measurement tool or test instrument. Nevertheless, regarding the scenario question, while 
only one out of six would have clearly responded to the issue presented on election day 
without assistance, that one participant had been trained as a chief judge. For the others, 
assistance notably would have been available to them in the form of a superior.  
Position-specific trainings and clear process maps appear to help participants 
compartmentalize the vast amount of information that could be made available. 
Furthermore, a high reliance on interdependence and collective knowledge appear to allow 
individuals to develop specific areas of understanding while others do the same in another 
specialization, such as checking in voters, spoiling and re-issuing ballots, or operating 
tabulation machines. Self-reference guides, charts, and cheat-sheet-type tools were utilized 
in many jurisdictions and found to be extremely helpful to poll workers. 
Voter understanding of the processes involved in elections is relatively low, and 
combined poll-worker and voter-education campaigns could dispel many common 
misperceptions. These similar campaigns could serve as a recruiting tool for poll workers 
as well, potentially helping what appears to be a shortage. 
C. ELECTION COORDINATOR INTERVIEWS 
The first interview was set up with the elections training coordinator, “Daisy” of 
the large county—the third largest in Idaho (see Table 1).138 In a typical election, Daisy 
trains approximately 320 temporary, part-time, paid poll workers to address the needs of 
the various precincts across the county. 
 
138 The county and its respective trainers have been anonymized by this author. 
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Table 1. Large Jurisdiction Demographics as of November 2020139 
County Demographics Large County, Idaho 
Population (estimated) 170,628  
Rank in population size (based on estimate) 3rd 
Registered Voters 103,549 
Voting Precincts 70 
Typical Poll-Worker Count 320 
New (First-Time) Poll Workers 200 
 
In 2020, the large county received a grant from the Idaho Secretary of State’s 
Office, made possible by the 2020 COVID CARES Act through the Election Assistance 
Commission. With funding from this grant, according to Daisy, the county acquired new 
electronic pollbooks and ballot-on-demand printers for the general presidential election in 
November. One of the recurring themes during the interview was how this technology 
impacted the election process and how it was received by voters and those working the 
polls. 
One area of tension centered on voters not clearly understanding the purpose of the 
pollbooks, and where they fit in the voting process. Because the pollbooks communicated 
wirelessly with a central statewide database, they reflected near-real-time updates on the 
status of a voter’s absentee ballot, giving poll workers the capacity to void or spoil an 
outstanding absentee ballot and allowing an individual to vote in person. This connectivity, 
however, was initially mistaken by many trainees, according to Daisy, as a connected 
voting machine, something they had learned from the media was a cybersecurity risk. “In 
hindsight, I wouldn’t have introduced new electronic pollbooks in a presidential. It got 
confused with ‘voting online’ because of all the rhetoric in the media,” said Daisy. 
“Anything plugged into a wall [the machines ran on 110v power and communicated with 
each other over an onsite ad hoc network] had to be bad.” 
 
139 Adapted from “County Population Totals: 2010–2020,” Census Bureau, accessed July 8, 2021, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest/technical-documentation/research/evaluation-
estimates/2020-evaluation-estimates/2010s-counties-total.html; “Voter Registration Totals,” Idaho 
Secretary of State’s Office, accessed July 8, 2021, https://sos.idaho.gov/elections-division/voter-
registration-totals/.  
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Providing extended exposure to the pollbook technology beyond the initial training 
for the poll workers proved to be a key differentiator. Daisy offered that a large base of the 
county’s poll workers before 2020 were elderly, so the new technology might have been 
unnerving to them. The county created a two-week window for poll workers to observe 
others use the technology or even try the machines themselves. Making time for them to 
have hands-on unstructured use before the rollout was beneficial. “When they saw how 
user-friendly they [pollbooks] are, they became more comfortable with them,” Daisy 
observed. 
Unique to the 2020 election, Daisy trained an exceedingly large group of first-time 
poll workers. While out of roughly 320 workers there had been only 26 and 36 new first-
time workers in the March and May 2020 elections, respectively, the November crew 
included 200 first-timers among a total of 350 temporary workers. This huge increase was 
attributed to the increased exposure risk to elderly individuals from the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
The average training session in the large county was held in a single evening, 
typically two and a half hours in duration. The training was offered three to four weeks 
before election day, as early voting locations typically opened within two weeks of the 
election. Daisy described the following about the training:  
• Training was accomplished with up to 40 workers in a session, with 
multiple sessions scheduled in a day. This kept class sizes smaller. 
• Participants signed up for sessions online via scheduling software. 
• Smaller groups tended to have better engagement and ask more questions. 
• The classes, one on policy and the other on process and technology, were 
approximately one hour each and included a 15-minute introduction at the 
beginning and a 15-minute break in between them. 
• Sessions were then broken into two groups of 20, and trainers switched at 
the midpoint. 
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• Workers received handouts, referred to as “cheat sheets,” to reference on 
election day. Based on job descriptions or roles on election day, these 
cheat sheets were used extensively for reference and continued study. 
• To combat side-distractions such as meal planning and social media use, 
quizzes and incentives like chocolate for right answers kept trainees 
engaged. As Daisy explained, “People put their cell phones down once 
they know there is chocolate available.” 
• The county offered a training website with the presentations for further 
review after the classes, and the web address appeared on the cheat sheets 
that went home with each trainee.  
• A specific challenge the county faced was having people complete the 
training but then back out before election day or not show up at all. This 
happens in one to two precincts every election, according to Daisy. The 
challenge in addressing this problem lies in the inability to run a new 
training session for replacement workers due to time. 
1. Large Jurisdiction Analysis 
The following points from the interview summarize the most important discoveries:  
• Regarding the electronic pollbooks and their connected status, neither poll 
workers nor voters initially understood what phase or step in the process 
the tool was addressing. Nor did they understand what security measures 
were being applied to ensure integrity and why the technology did not 
represent a significant risk to election integrity. 
• Poll workers tended to be more elderly and appreciate additional time to 
become familiar with new technology. 
• As poll workers continued to age up and out of service, training a new 
work force and replacing tacit knowledge becomes more critical. 
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• Actual poll-worker training time was extremely limited, possibly even less 
than eight hours before arriving on post for a shift. 
• Due to this limited training, creating alternative reference guides and 
making additional exposures available increased poll-worker effectiveness 
and preparedness. 
• Temporary workers have shown they are willing to put in additional 
unpaid training time to do the job well. 
The second interview was set up with the elections training coordinator, “Jenny” 
for the small county—ranked 36th of 44 counties by population in Idaho (see Table 2).140 
For the November 2020 election, Jenny had to train only 80 temporary, part-time, paid poll 
workers, the majority of whom were experienced workers, to address the needs of the 
various polling locations across the small county. 
Table 2. Small Jurisdiction Demographics as of November 2020141 
County Demographics Small County, Idaho 
Population (estimated) 6,143 
Rank in population size (based on estimate) 36th 
Registered Voters 3,688 
Voting Precincts 10 
Typical Poll-Worker Count 80 
New (First-Time) Poll Workers 8 
 
Like the large county, the small county received a 2020 COVID CARES Act grant 
funded through the Election Assistance Commission and administered by the Idaho 
Secretary of State’s Office. The small county spent over 75 percent of its funding on 
personal protective equipment (PPE); postage; personnel expenses, for example, overtime 
due to increased COVID workloads; and five new laptops for its staff. These investments 
 
140 The county and its respective trainers have been anonymized by this author. 
141 Adapted from Census Bureau, “County Population Totals”; Idaho Secretary of State’s Office, 
“Voter Registration Totals.”  
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were predominantly security and modernization expenditures, as opposed to creating new 
election capabilities by purchasing new equipment.  
The county did not purchase electronic pollbooks. “The only tech we use are 
Express Votes [a machine that facilitates adaptive voting] . . . because the consumers don’t 
have confidence in what the machine is supposed to accomplish for them. . . . They are 
concerned the data is connected to a bigger ‘hub,’ and voters want to make sure that their 
ballot goes to a ‘safe place,’” says Jenny. Especially following the 2020 presidential 
election cycle, according to Jenny, “voter confidence is lower.” Even with that observed 
drop in confidence and the county’s reluctance to adopt new technology, the county is 
looking into adopting electronic pollbooks for 2022.  
Its poll workers plan to attend an election in a neighboring county in 2021 to watch 
the electronic pollbooks in action because county leaders believe the technology presents 
an easy-to-maintain option to which voters statewide have responded positively. Should 
the county ultimately decide to make the purchase, leaders believe that a rollout plan will 
be key to a successful implementation. “A segment of our population believes that elections 
can be ‘rigged,’ that conspiracy exists,” explains Jenny. She maintains that if the voters 
had something to consume to help them understand how the machines and the process of 
voting work, they would have more confidence in the process.  
The county’s largest city is home to nearly half the county’s population. The county 
seat has a population of just over 500. As such, the entire county is captured in just 10 
precincts. Each uses a team of eight poll workers, for a part-time poll-worker group of 
around 80. In the November 2020 election, only eight of these poll workers served for the 
first time. “With a small community, we have one-on-one training with new people because 
we have the ability to do so,” says Jenny. Trainers use physical samples of registration 
cards and pollbooks in their trainings and, except for first-timers, typically “deep-dive one 
topic per election, then skim and Q&A the others, as well as review any issues from the 
previous election,” according to Jenny. Once a year, all poll workers come together for a 
full overview of all the steps, and they are encouraged to rotate positions on an election-
by-election basis for additional growth. “They are very serious about this job,” Jenny 
claims. When asked how she thought they would react to additional out-of-office training 
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delivered at home, she responded, “I’m positive that all our poll workers would be ecstatic 
to have homework in the month prior to an election.” 
Jenny described the following about the training: 
• Training is easier to pull off because everyone knows everyone. There is 
relational context and trust due to the community’s size. However, this 
trust makes poll workers significantly more influential in the eyes of the 
voter, a situation that can be both good and bad. 
• Finding new poll workers is a challenge, which makes fill-ins and 
back-ups difficult. 
• Poll workers are older and, as such, a little set in their ways, so anything 
new takes a few repetitions to get them used to it. 
• Elections in the county office are basically “a one-person show,” as only 
four total workers in the office fulfill eight county functions. 
• There is less technology to train on, as the small county counts ballots by 
hand and at the precinct (i.e., manual, precinct tabulation). 
• Flip charts of processes and physical samples of consumables are used as 
references for poll workers to complete their jobs accurately. One 
particular success story was a first-time chief judge who came into the 
office, put in additional personal time for training, and went through every 
flip chart.  
2. Small Jurisdiction Analysis 
The following points from the interview summarize the most important discoveries: 
• In a smaller community, relational context increases efficiency of training. 
• Poll workers are highly dedicated to their work, but learning opportunities 
are limited. 
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• The tight-knit nature of the group, with low numbers and high retention, 
could facilitate friendly competition. 
• Technology, while not prevalent, is feared but not rejected. Once 
understood as beneficial to the job, the technology will be received 
openly. 
• Temporary workers have shown they are willing to put in additional 
unpaid training time to do the job well. 
• A lack of exposure (e.g., to processes or technology) drives fear of 
adoption. 
• Given the small size of staff, anything that improves efficiency would be 
welcomed. 
3. Comparative Analysis: Large versus Small County 
Based on information gleaned from both the small and large county trainer 
interviews, the following comparative and contrasting points are noted: 
• With regard to implementing new technology, fear and a lack of 
understanding drive resistance to adoption in both small and large 
counties. Larger counties, which tend to have greater access to funding, 
may adopt technology more quickly but not necessarily accept it widely 
while smaller counties have more opportunities to take their time and let 
acceptance build before the acquisition. 
• Both small and large counties face the common challenges of older poll 
workers who are resistant to change until they can see the benefits of a 
technology. 
• Both small and large counties operate in a limited training window, 
averaging less than three hours of formal training. 
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• Both small and large counties rely on analog reference guides as a fallback 
to retained knowledge, whether in the form of notes from training, flip 
charts, or quick-reference guides.  
• Both trainers were confident that exposing poll workers more extensively 
to technology would increase their effectiveness, preparedness, and 
technology acceptance. 
• Though only temporary and part-time, poll workers in both small and 
large counties have demonstrated the desire and ability to do the job well, 
and their trainers believe they would be willing to put in time outside of 
formal training to increase their competency. 
• While the small county cited the small staff size and the large county the 
sheer number of people it needed to train, both agreed that tools to 
improve the efficiency of training or serve as force multipliers would be 
advantageous to the training of poll workers (see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Comparative Analysis142 
 Large County Small County 
2020 Population (estimated) 170,628 6,143 
Rank in population size (of 44) 3rd 36th 
Registered voters  103,549 3,688 
Voting precincts 70 10 
Typical poll-worker count 320 80 
New (first-time) poll workers 200 8 
On what did you spend the majority of 
your 2020 COVID funding provided by 
the Idaho Secretary of State, or any 
federal COVID relief funds? 
Electronic Pollbooks (EPBs) 
PPE, postage for absentee 
ballots, personnel costs for 
overtime, and five new laptops 
for elections 
What technology do you use? 
EPBs, ballot on demand, Elections 
Software & Solutions (ES&S)’s 
central count tabulators, and ES&S 
Express Votes 
ES&S Express Votes 
How comfortable are consumers with 
the tech you use? 
Fairly confident. We’ve used tech 
for a while and have good 
adoption. 
Consumers have low 
confidence due to low 
utilization. 
How comfortable are your poll workers 
with the tech you use? 
Extremely now, but it wasn’t easy 
getting there. They get multiple 
opportunities to familiarize with it 
prior to using it in front of public. 
Reluctant and hesitant, until 
they use it and see how easy it 
is. Going to another county to 
watch EPBs in use this year. 
How is voter confidence in the election 
system? low low 
Do you face conspiracy concerns or 
rigged elections allegations from the 
public? 
definitely yes 
Would training materials specific to the 
technology help with your poll workers’ 
acceptance? 
yes yes 
Would training materials specific to the 




Time and volume. Too many 
people to train effectively in 
traditional ways. 
Poll workers are significantly 
influential in a voter’s eyes, 
which can be both good and 
bad. 
Best tool 
Chocolate during training for 
attention retention (reward for 
pop quizzes) 
Take home flip charts and 
handouts, 1:1 training of new 
recruits 
Would your poll workers take on 
additional at-home training, and if so, 
how many hours do you think they 
would take? 
Definitely, and up to 3–4 hours. 
Willing to put in unpaid time to 
do the job well, likely 2–4 
hours, more if due to friendly 
competition. 
Additional Comment Voter no-shows are a consistent and challenging problem. 
Anything that can help us scale 
our small staff and improve 
efficiency is welcomed. 
 
142 Demographics adapted from Census Bureau, “County Population Totals”; Idaho Secretary of 
State’s Office, “Voter Registration Totals.” Demographics are based on data as of November 2020. 
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V. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter presents two case studies that illustrate opposite outcomes for nearly 
parallel situations—a failed 2020 reporting application rollout and a successful 2016 
rollout of a solution with similar functions. This approach is used to identify important 
foundational practices for implementing and deploying consumer-facing technology in the 
election space. The analysis of these case studies appears in reverse chronological order to 
emphasize the failures exhibited in 2020 before revealing the simple differences that led to 
a successful deployment four years earlier. The author examines how lessons observed by 
comparison can be translated to poll-worker training. Specific attention is paid to lessons 
that will assist in setting poll workers up for success when deploying new technology in 
the election environment, thus providing positive voter experiences and instilling 
confidence in that technology. 
Before approaching the case studies, a bit of historical context is in order. Following 
2012’s premature declaration by the Iowa Republican Party of Mitt Romney’s win by a 
mere four-vote margin—a result that days later would be overturned upon recount and 
become a 34-vote victory for Rick Santorum—Iowa chose to fund the development of an 
application for both parties to use in calculating and reporting results statewide in 2016.143 
It would present the total delegates on a precinct-by-precinct basis and be tailored to each 
party’s unique caucus processes.144 As 2020 approached, however, some rules had 
changed, and the state had not yet offered to pick up the tab.145 As a result, the Democratic 
Party of Iowa appears to have gone its own way. “The Iowa Democratic Party didn’t 
respond to request for comment on why it didn’t use the 2016 app [for 2020], and Microsoft 
 
143 Aaron Blake, “For Iowa, a Second Caucus Debacle in Eight Years,” Washington Post, February 4, 
2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/04/iowa-second-caucus-debacle-eight-years/; 
Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 Caucus App Worked.” 
144 Dan’l Lewin, “Microsoft Technology to Usher in New Era for 2016 Iowa Caucuses,” Microsoft, 
June 5, 2015, https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2015/06/05/microsoft-technology-to-usher-in-new-
era-for-2016-iowa-caucuses/. 
145 Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
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wouldn’t comment beyond a tweet from a spokesperson that said it wasn’t involved in the 
2020 app,” wrote Sara Morrison in her post-2020-caucus review.146  
A. FAILURE OF THE 2020 IOWA CAUCUS APP 
“First in the nation.” That is the unofficial tagline of the Iowa Caucuses. Since 1972, 
Iowa has had the distinction of hosting the first presidential nominating processes in the 
country for both principal U.S. political parties. To maintain that distinction, the Iowa 
Legislature established the practice in law, saying the state must schedule its caucuses at 
least eight days before any other state.147 It has been said that Iowa is “not first because 
they’re important; they’re important because they’re first.”148 That special distinction 
proved problematic in 2020, when the new app developed to report the Iowa Democratic 
Party’s 2020 caucus results failed dramatically on its spotlight night of February 3, 
delaying initial results by days and final results by nearly a week, ultimately leading to 
recounts that consumed the remaining month of February 2020.149  
Kim Smiley, a mechanical engineer and specialist in root cause analysis who 
investigates failures from an engineering perspective, analyzed the failed rollout of the 
2020 Iowa caucus app.150 At the core of the app’s failed deployment were four contributing 
factors: a lack of experience; a lack of proper funding; a lack of adequate time, which led 
to derivative issues such as a lack of testing, poor deployment tactics, and a lack of proper 
end-user training; and a poorly constructed contingency plan.151 See Figure 9 for a map of 
the causal relationships between these factors and related decisions. 
 
146 Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 Caucus App Worked.” 
147 “Code Section Listings,” Iowa Legislature, accessed July 17, 2021, https://www.legis.iowa.gov/law/
iowaCode/sections?codeChapter=43&year=2021; Iowa Code, § 43.4(1) (2021). 
148 “Iowa Democratic Caucus Election Results,” Des Moines Register, February 29, 2020, https://www.
desmoinesregister.com/elections/results/primaries/democratic/iowa/. 
149 Associated Press, “Nevada Democrats Dropping Caucus App after Iowa Fiasco,” MarketWatch, 
February 4, 2020, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/nevada-democrats-dropping-caucus-app-after-iowa-
fiasco-2020-02-04; “Iowa Democratic Caucus Election Results”; Blake, “Second Caucus Debacle in Eight 
Years.” 
150 “Kimberly Smiley, P.E.,” LinkedIn,” accessed August 29, 2021, https://www.linkedin.com/in/
kimberly-smiley-p-e-2a1b4666/; Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
151 Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
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While several parties, ranging from the end users to the Iowa Democratic Party, 
might bear some blame in the failure of the 2020 Iowa caucus app, the greatest weight 
lands on the shoulders of a company formerly named Shadow, which following the Iowa 
failure changed its name to BlueLink.152 Shadow was hired to handle the Democratic 
caucus, by many accounts, only months before the crucial February event date—some say 
August while others say the timeline was even more condensed.153 Project management 
methodology generally prioritizes decisions based on three key variables—time, budget, 
and scope—assuming quality is a necessary predefined constant. These variables 
collectively constitute what is known as the theory of triple constraint, which holds that if 
one of the three variables is changed, one of the other two must also change for the third to 
stay in balance without altering quality.154 In other words, “Good, fast, or cheap. Choose 
two.”155 For example, if a vendor wanted the scope of a project to expand, either the time 
to complete the project or the price charged would likewise have to increase. Based on this 
principle, one can shorten the time to delivery by increasing personnel, but only with 
increased cost and if scope does not change—lest product quality falters. To that end, the 
following variables are considered.  
1. Time 
The constraint of time was important, as Shadow was notably short of it. Smiley’s 
case study indicates that Shadow began work in August for a January deadline—a period 
of five months.156 Other press reports following the caucus stated that Shadow had less 
than two to three months in total.157 As the timeline compressed around the company, 
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Shadow’s app developers had insufficient time to obtain approval from Apple for inclusion 
in its App Store, and similar issues arose on the Android side of the market. Thus, users 
would have to go through a process to bypass their phones’ security to install the app 
manually—a significant product quality issue from a usability standpoint.158 Ultimately, 
this installation work-around, which was a function of too little time, would mean that 
fewer than 25 percent (439 out of 1,700) of those required to report results would even 
install the app by caucus night.159 It also meant there was likewise little time for pre-rollout 
bug testing and no time for an update to be pushed once a bug was identified on election 
night, as users had already begun to submit inaccurate results.160 In short, Shadow had too 
little time for the scope of the task. 
2. Experience 
Regardless of whether the company had two months or six, the small team of 
inexperienced engineers at Shadow were unequipped to produce such a product given the 
tight timeline.161 The company had never developed a product of this nature and had 
previous experience only in creating texting and donation apps for the political market, 
based on their list of clientele.162 As a result, critical errors were made in almost every 
aspect of project management. Furthermore, no explanations were given for Shadow’s 
“secret” selection by the Iowa Democratic Party, leaving the public to speculate as to the 
founders’ connections to Hillary Clinton’s failed 2016 presidential campaign and 
subsequent ties to the DNC.163 Essentially, its lack of experience prevented the company 
from identifying the proper scope, necessary resources, and appropriate timeline. 
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3. Funding 
Campaign finance reports collected by the New York Times showed that Iowa paid 
only $63,183 for the project.164 Nevada reports having paid “technology services” in an 
amount of $58,000 in August to Shadow, with an additional $50,000 spread over October 
and December.165 Following the Iowa caucus, Nevada chose not to use the app. Between 
these two states and based on their reports, this author estimates that Shadow would have 
received payments of merely $171,183 for the endeavor. As is shown in the subsequent 
case study, this figure is a comparably small amount for the development of such a critical 
application in such a tight timeline, and it does not equate with sufficient funding to hire 
the additional engineers who would have been necessary to adjust for the shortfalls in either 
the experience or timeline areas from a project management perspective.  
4. Contingency Planning 
With roughly 75 percent of the user population unable or unwilling to install the 
application, the contingency plans became a prominent focus of the overall deployment. A 
phone bank had been established with human operators originally intended to provide 
customer support on the application. Instead, it became a hotline through which the results 
ultimately were reported. The phone bank, however, was understaffed to cover the volume 
of calls—a volume four times greater than anticipated—and unprepared to handle 
incoming results reporting, likewise causing it to fail.166 Combined with the prevalent 
human-induced errors from operating under timeline stress, several reporting discrepancies 
began appearing in the results, eventually leading to requests for recounts from two 
presidential campaigns. The bottom line was, when all else failed—and it did—so did the 
backup plan. 
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5. A Set-Up for Failure 
In summary, timing or lack thereof proved to be everything, both in the challenges 
faced and in a lack of solutions to them. According to Smiley, “If the issues with the app 
had been identified earlier and were fixed prior to the caucus, then a lot of heart burn, 
embarrassment, and stress could have been avoided.”167 With the timing as it was, 
however, Iowa’s Democratic Party faced a series of delays and recounts that did not subside 
until February 29, when the Iowa Democratic Party finally announced the results.168 It did 
not have to be that way, however. The 2016 Iowa caucus provides insight into how a project 
with relatively similar functionality requirements succeeded for the Iowa Democratic Party 
as well as its Republican counterparts.169 
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Figure 9. Causal Map of 2020 App Failure170 
 
170 Source: Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
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B. SUCCESS OF THE 2016 IOWA CAUCUS APP 
The results of another app deployment stand in stark contrast to the outcome and 
events of the Iowa Democratic Caucus of 2020, and ironically, it was also in Iowa—in 
2016. Guided by a company called InterKnowlogy, under a contract from well-known U.S. 
software provider Microsoft, the 2016 app was used by not only the Iowa Democratic Party 
but also the Republicans. It was experimental, had a similarly low-adoption percentage, 
and leveraged a contingency plan for those unwilling or unable to use the application. 
Because the two apps share so many similarities yet saw such different outcomes, the 2016 
app can provide insight into those things done differently. Ironically, because the rollout 
of the 2016 app experienced far fewer public complications than the 2020 app did, most of 
the public has likely never heard of it.  
1. Experience as a Predictor of Success 
InterKnowlogy is an enterprise software development firm, recruited by Microsoft 
to assist both of Iowa’s political parties by providing a “mobile-enabled, cloud-based 
platform that will facilitate accuracy and efficiency of the reporting process.”171 The 
company is a Microsoft Gold Partner, which means it has a dedicated vendor support 
agreement directly with Microsoft solutions engineers should an unforeseen conflict arise 
during a client’s project.172 Given that the Iowa Republican Party had incorrectly declared 
Mitt Romney the official winner of the caucus in 2012, both parties were looking for a 
better solution to assist them in collecting caucus reports on primary night and tabulating 
those results more accurately.173 They reached out to Microsoft, and the project was kicked 
off to create the first of its kind mobile app for the first-in-the-nation primary state. As 
Microsoft engaged, it looked to a partner with whom it had completed several “primetime 
apps,” such as the CNN Magic Wall, according to co-founder and co-CEO of 
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InterKnowlogy, Rodney Guzman.174 Not only did Guzman’s team have experience 
partnering with Microsoft on large-scale apps that had to be right the first time deployed, 
it also had a deep bench of engineers, assigning as many as five to seven of them to the 
project at once, with an entire support team in place on rollout night should anything go 
wrong. This deep bench would prove beneficial in reducing needed time and valuable as 
an element of the contingency plan. 
2. Time 
According to Guzman, InterKnowlogy had roughly a year to work on the project 
from concept to completion for the 2016 Iowa primary, and spent as much as three months 
on the front end “on product design, meeting with both parties, and doing usability studies 
to anticipate precinct chair’s needs.”175 The team’s project scoping and requirement 
documentation was so in-depth that it had determined details down to the size of the buttons 
used on the phone’s screen before even beginning actual development.176 Preliminary 
testing alone was, according to InterKnowlogy software engineer Michael Gramley, a 
two-month step in the development timeline.177 Also factored into InterKnowlogy’s 
timeline was a window of months during which a customer service team would interface 
with end-user precinct chairs, many of whom in 2016 might not have owned or used a 
smartphone or had “little experience with apps, let alone any familiarity with necessary 
security measures like two-factor authentication,” said Gramley.178 Finally, the timeline 
defined for the project allowed for the app to be rolled out through Apple’s App Store and 
the Android Marketplace, two established distribution channels with understood 
installation protocols, as early as October 2015. This distribution path also allowed for 
application updates and code changes as standardized updates through the normal process 
on the user’s phone should a bug be found. 
 
174 Lewin, “Microsoft Technology to Usher in New Era”; Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 Caucus App 
Worked.” 






While no hard figure was published, InterKnowlogy is reported to have had 
adequate resources to put five to seven full-time software engineers on the project, a level 
of effort that would have yielded a payroll of over $1,000,000 for the project, according to 
Gramley.179 Guzman, while unwilling in his interview with case study author Sara 
Morrison to share exactly what his company was paid in 2016 for its work, likewise put 
the number north of the $1–$1.5 million mark, stating that it was “at least” 10 times what 
Shadow was paid in 2020.180 These significantly larger financial resources allowed 
InterKnowlogy to produce an app that deployed smoothly, worked as intended, and met 
the needs of the customer.  
4. Contingency Planning 
Anticipating that they would need to provide customer support on the night of 
reporting, and that for whatever reason some users would need to report their results by an 
alternative channel, InterKnowlogy devised an automated phone system. Focused on 
simplicity, the automated prompts allowed users to manually enter their results for a given 
precinct and verify those results without needing to speak to a human unless the data were 
incorrect. This system proved to be highly scalable and saw little to no wait times, with 
adequate resources allocated for the size of the userbase.181 
C. CASE STUDY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS  
While the products designed by both parties in the case studies were similar, the 
outcomes were vastly different. The applicable variables observed included the experience 
of the firm, the time available for completion of the project, the funding available to the 
project, and the contingency plans in place should something go wrong. These specific 
areas showed stark contrasts between the two cases examined and appear to have been 







In terms of experience, InterKnowlogy was an established Microsoft Gold Partner, 
a certification level that brings with it resources like dedicated Microsoft developer 
support.182 Backed by one of the largest software manufacturers in the world, 
InterKnowlogy had the customer support teams and project managers sufficient to provide 
deep coverage to multiple customers at once. Shadow was a small shop that had focused 
primarily on text-messaging solutions, with little experience in the app development space 
or on an app with this level of criticality.  
2. Time 
InterKnowlogy took on the project in 2015 with over a year to prepare and spent 
more time in product design discussions than Shadow did on the whole project. The former 
also spent more time testing the app after developing a code-complete product than Shadow 
did actually developing its product. Guzman is reported to have said that if he had been 
offered the timeline Shadow was given, he would have rejected the project.183 
3. Funding 
Funding is a visibly evident differentiator, with a multiple of 10 in favor of 
InterKnowlogy as a starting point. While Shadow was reportedly working on other projects 
for other clients, the total reported to the Federal Election Commission for this project from 
the Iowa Democratic Party was below $65,000. Even in adding an additional $108,000, as 
reported by Nevada, the total constitutes a significantly smaller pool of resources from 
which Shadow could try to hire its way out of an issue. 
4. Contingency Plans 
The contingency plans likewise differentiate how each company answered the 
question “What if . . .?” Shadow appeared to have put the phone bank in as an afterthought, 
not providing nearly enough capacity for the thousands of calls it would eventually get, 
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compounded by the calls from Trump supporters who had pulled the hotline number off a 
4chan message board, and frustrating users who found the hotline number on social 
media.184 InterKnowlogy, anticipating a need but understanding the requirements of scale, 
appears to have designed a plan that lacked a human limitation factor, instead solving the 
core requirement of the 2016 app—reporting the result—by providing a computer-driven 
interface that let users input numerical data using their keypads. See Table 4 for the side-
by-side comparison of the cases. 
  
 
184 Smiley, “Iowa Caucus Results Delay.” 
81 
Table 4. Comparative Analysis, Iowa Caucus Apps185 
 Iowa 2016, InterKnowlogy Iowa 2020, Shadow 
Experience 
Microsoft, a far-reaching company with 
extensive human resources, hired 
InterKnowlogy, a 20-year-old enterprise 
development company with a track 
record of “primetime apps,” as a 
subcontractor. 
The Iowa Democratic Party hired a 
previously bankrupt company 
headed by two former Clinton 
campaign workers.  
Time 
*A one-year lead time, with three 
months in planning, design, and research. 
*More than six months of 5–7 full-time 
engineers during development (not 
including months of scoping and 
planning prior). 
*Code-complete deployment two months 
ahead of caucus with duration of time 
testing and debugging.  
*Engineering team still worked 80-hour 
weeks in final lead-up to caucus. 
*Got app to Apple and Android stores. 
*August–December, according to 
Shadow CEO, though multiple 
reports say only 2–3 months for 
actual coding. 
*Did not get app approved at Apple 
or Android, leaving users to bypass 
security on devices to load the app. 
Funding 
Undisclosed but reported by 
InterKnowlogy exec as “at least” 10x 
more than Shadow, while another 
familiar with the project claimed 
engineers alone would have billed $1–
$1.5 million  
Approx. $2,000,000 
$63,138 in Iowa 




Automated phone system to call in 
results. Sources say a “large percentage” 
still used this system over the app, but 
short of “a couple disconnections” there 
were few issues. 
Human operators on phones, with 
too few phone lines to handle the 
volume that resulted from low 
install numbers and app bugs. 
 
D. CASE STUDY TRANSLATION: BRINGING THE LESSONS LEARNED 
TO THIS THESIS 
Perhaps the greatest differentiator in the case studies examined is not a single error 
but rather a whole greater than the sum of the parts—a combined failure to acquire in 
 
185 Adapted from Morrison, “Iowa’s 2016 Caucus App Worked”; Rosenberg et al., “Faulty Iowa App”; 
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advance the needed time, money, and experience—to set the user up for failure. Shadow 
found itself without enough of any one of the three constraints—time, cash, or 
experience—to ultimately afford its users the means to install the app through traditional 
channels. Shadow required users to undertake a foreign process to a common procedure, 
to bypass their phones’ security and follow a complicated set of written instructions to 
install the app, something fewer than 25 percent of the users accomplished. 
InterKnowlogy’s apps were available through common commercial pathways for both 
Apple and Android devices. This contrast underlines what this author believes may be the 
most important factor in successfully deploying technology at an election space: the 
capacity and limitations of the intended end users relevant to the technology, and the 
implications for designing a training plan. InterKnowlogy spent months, after making the 
app available to load by users, working with those users and training them in its correct 
use, resolving problems ahead of caucus night. Shadow, in contrast, used the phone line 
for reporting results on election night to solve app installation problems and provide 
customer assistance.186 
What is clear from these two case studies is that while proper time, budget, and 
contingency planning must be present for a technology rollout to be successful, it is an 
understanding of the limiting factors of the user population, whether voters, caucus chairs, 
or—in the case of this thesis—poll workers, that must be at the center of the discussion. If 
the poll worker cannot use or understand the technology or explain it to a voter, the 
technology will harm rather than bolster the voter’s experience and, thus, voter confidence 
in election integrity. Chapter VI further addresses these ideas and those drawn from the 
research interviews and focus group. 
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VI. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis sought to address whether the training of poll workers generally—and 
their training on technology specifically—could be improved to enhance the voter 
experience and increase voter confidence in the election process. This was a necessary 
inquiry, as this thesis has established that, since 2004, voter confidence has been used as a 
measure of the voter’s willingness to accept the outcome of an election. Furthermore, this 
thesis has demonstrated that this willingness to accept the outcome of an election is a key 
component in sustaining democracy, as evidenced by the peaceful transition of power in 
the United States for over 200 years. Yet the peaceful transition of power was challenged 
more significantly following the 2020 presidential election than at any time in recent 
history, as societal events demonstrated a higher-than-normal percentage of voters who 
rejected the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. This rejection revealed a sentiment, 
which research has reinforced, that voter confidence as a measure of U.S. election integrity 
has been on the decline. Therefore, those responsible for setting election policies and 
administering elections in the United States must curb the erosion of confidence in the 
integrity of the American election ecosystem. In pursuit of that goal, the following findings 
and associated conclusions are presented for consideration in Section A, with 
recommendations for policy and practice in Section B of this chapter. 
A. FINDINGS AND ASSOCIATED CONCLUSIONS 
The following pages present several key findings that rose to the surface of the 
research and literature for this project. Election policymakers, election administrators, and 
professional public servants who operate within the realm of today’s election environment 
should examine each critical understanding. Following each finding is a conclusion in bold 
drawn from the work conducted herein. These are the author’s assertions of the necessary 
campaigns within the larger battle for the confidence of U.S. voters in the electoral process. 
• The voters’ experience at the polls—in person on election day—has a 
direct corollary relationship to their confidence in the integrity of the 
election system; therefore, it is in the best interest of the elections 
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community to ensure those poll experiences are as positive as possible 
in terms of the ability to cast a ballot successfully, the time to do so, 
any issues encountered in that process, and the way those issues are 
handled.187 
• Poll workers are largely temporary, part-time staff who are hired and 
trained only shortly before they are needed for an election. Poll-worker 
interactions with voters in polling locations directly affect the voters’ 
overall experience, either positively or negatively; therefore, it is 
necessary to consider the manner and method used in training poll 
workers to increase their preparedness, and to recognize how poll-
worker actions will impact voter experience. 
• Voters who have a greater understanding of the processes of an election 
have less reason to interact extensively with poll workers; therefore, 
voter education is a critical component in combatting the erosion of 
voter confidence and a potential means of reducing the impact of poll-
worker training on voter confidence by diminishing the voter’s need 
for assistance at the polls (see Figure 10). 
 
187 The focus on poll workers necessarily relegated the scope of this paper to jurisdictions that use such 
workers in a physical polling location on election day. While parallels might be drawn to early voting, it is 
this author’s experience that the limited number of locations for early voting results in staffing by agency 
professionals. Nonetheless, the recommendations made here for training those individuals—and the impact 
their actions have on the voting public vis-à-vis voter confidence—are likely applicable but outside the 
scope of this thesis. A similar position is taken regarding the processes of mail-in and absentee voting and 
the individuals who would assist voters with those processes. 
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Figure 10. Impacts of Poll-Worker Actions on In-Person Voter 
Experience188 
• The subject matter needed for a broad voter-education campaign is similar 
to that needed for increasing poll-worker understanding and preparedness. 
As such, it would be possible to leverage media or educational 
material generated for a voter-education audience to the benefit of a 
poll-worker training audience as well, and vice-versa.  
• Technology is becoming more prominent in polling locations as funds 
infused by the Help America Vote Act grants in both 2018 and 2020 
enabled jurisdictions to make technology investments.  
• Poll workers tend to be older and have less daily exposure to or interaction 
with technology, and most poll workers undergo only 2–3.5 hours of 
training per election training cycle.  
 
188 Figure 10 is entirely the author’s creation, derived from the premises of Claassen et al., “‘At Your 
Service’”; and Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers.” 
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• As the case studies in this paper demonstrate, the theory of three 
constraints manipulates time, scope, and costs to produce a functioning 
product. This thesis has demonstrated that while these three constraints are 
all inputs to developing a technology, considering the capacity and 
limitations of the intended end users in navigating the technology must 
drive the design of a functional training plan if the technology is to be 
successfully deployed.  
• As the voter does not typically see the technology used in the voting 
experience until election day, the poll worker becomes the sole agent for 
translating all the time, budget, and expertise invested by the developers to 
the voter or end user through demonstrating knowledge of the technology. 
Expecting a poll worker to explain the use of technology without having a 
thorough understanding and competency oneself would be unreasonable; 
therefore, the amount of knowledge required (scope) cannot be adjusted 
and additional dollars cannot increase the poll worker’s or voter’s ability 
to use the technology in the moment (funding), so time is the only 
constraint that can be adjusted in what is effectively a new project—
training the poll worker to train the voter to use the technology. 
Therefore, since election day is a fixed end point, the poll worker must 
be permitted time to use the technology in advance.  
• Trainings tend to focus on policy and procedure, with most time spent on 
the norms, not on what to do when the unexpected occurs, especially with 
technology. This approach to training leaves many poll workers 
unprepared for what to do when the unintended happens or ill-equipped to 
handle a situation without waiting for technical assistance, thus increasing 
the time it takes a voter to enter, vote, and leave the polling location. This 
extended time is a negative as it lessens the likelihood of a positive 
voter experience. 
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• Unlike in retail environments where trainees are typically identified as in 
training and supported by a trainer, to voters, first-time poll workers are 
visually indistinguishable from their more-experienced colleagues in an 
election environment; therefore, voters have no means by which to 
differentiate levels of experience or base expectations. This lack of visual 
differentiation places less-experienced poll workers at risk of failing to 
meet voter expectations and, likewise, does not help voters understand 
who should have what knowledge. 
• Poll workers sense a high degree of civic duty and, as such, a desire to do 
the job well for altruistic reasons. They are less motivated by pay and 
demonstrate a willingness to take on additional training, especially at 
home or remotely. Furthermore, based on this author’s research, poll 
workers who were given an opportunity to spend additional time gaining 
familiarity with new equipment took advantage of that opportunity; 
therefore, it is in the best interest of the poll worker, the jurisdiction 
which they are serving, and ultimately the voter to make additional 
non-mandatory training available to poll workers, especially if 
technology will be used in a jurisdiction. 
• Specific to the task of training poll workers, the trainers interviewed for 
this thesis expressed a limitation in both time and resources to accomplish 
the task. In most jurisdictions, completion of training, as opposed to 
testing or certification, is the sole means of measuring poll-worker 
preparedness. However, to paraphrase a member of the focus group, 
testing for certification could be a means of both validating the poll 
worker’s preparedness as an outcome of the training and measuring the 
efficacy of the training/trainer as an input to that training. To validate the 
material or trainers, a level of standardization in training materials 
would be necessary. Then, the matter of delivering that material could be 
evaluated as an independent variable. Other variables could include the 
length instructors are given to cover the same material, the portions of the 
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material presented to trainees outside of training, and the manner of 
advanced preparation. 
• The quality of the recruit has an impact on the effectiveness of the 
training, given the short window of exposure.189 With this higher uptake 
and retention in mind, an emphasis on recruiting quality over quantity 
could likewise serve to reduce the constrained time issue while increasing 
the likelihood of successful training and improving voter experiences. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATTING THE EROSION OF 
VOTER CONFIDENCE 
It is important to reiterate that the scope of this thesis was narrowed to two small 
facets of the larger, more-encompassing American voting ecosystem. The press, whether 
online, in print, or over the air; the candidates and their campaigns; elected officials and 
their staff; and even the voters themselves in how they conduct their civil discourse all can 
help to erode or build voter confidence in election integrity. Many nuances within this 
domain are worthy of consideration for future research. Poll workers and the technology 
they use and instruct others to use, however, are front and center for voters who choose to 
cast their ballots at the polls on election day and are foundational in shaping those voters’ 
election experiences. For this reason, this author makes the following recommendations 
for policymakers and elections administrators in combatting the erosion of voter 
confidence at the polls. 
• Additional research should be undertaken by counties and states in 
partnership with their local universities to discover the levels of 
effectiveness achieved by varied means of poll-worker training, including 
 
189 This assertion is based on this author’s direct experience—having participated in recruiting, 
training, and deploying of over 80 professional state employees from various divisions as emergency fill-in 
poll workers—and observations of the focus group comprising first-time poll workers who demonstrated 
professional qualities/backgrounds and effectiveness with a limited (2–3 hour) training exposure. The 
ability to assimilate, retain, and subsequently apply vast information in a short training period makes the 
quality of a recruit a factor for consideration, perhaps over quantity—a position likewise held by Burden 
and Milyo in their research. Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of Poll Workers.”  
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but not limited to the use of online learning modules, quizzes, and 
certification exams. 
• States should assist local jurisdictions in standardizing the more broadly 
applicable aspects of election administration, paving the way for a 
standardized state-level basic training, and increasing consistency in 
training materials while likely improving local jurisdictional compliance 
with state laws. 
• States should assist local jurisdictions in creating a new generation of 
poll workers with a focus on quality over quantity, by developing 
recruiting tactics and programs that help to lower the average age and 
increase the focus on professionals. This effort could include incentivizing 
local businesses to provide poll workers with a vacation day, declaring 
election days a state holiday, or freeing up for the day those state 
employees who have passed, as evidenced by an exam, a state-provided 
training course to serve as poll workers. 
• States should undertake the task of creating a comprehensive voter-
education plan that covers, at a minimum, the following procedures and 
processes: registering voters, requesting a ballot, receiving and marking a 
ballot, returning a ballot, and tabulating ballots, as well as election 
administration basics and election fraud controls. This education plan will 
serve as a first line of defense in combatting the erosion of voter 
confidence. 
• Material from the voter-education plan should be leveraged, in parallel, to 
provide local jurisdictions with either a state prerequisite course of 
standardized poll-worker training, or base material from which they can 
compile a poll worker’s basic training library. 
• Consistent with the designation of elections as critical infrastructure, 
emphasizing the importance of the physical and cyber security of the 
elections sector and its need for financial support by appropriation, state 
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and federal legislatures should acknowledge the pathway that leads from 
voter education and poll-worker preparation, through voter experience, to 
the public’s confidence (or lack thereof) in election integrity. 
• State and federal appropriation committees should likewise make funds 
available to secretaries of state or appropriate state election officials for 
the express purpose of combatting the erosion of voter confidence through 
improved poll-worker recruitment, training, and technology 
familiarization. 
• Regarding technology used in elections, local jurisdictions should first run 
and achieve success with a pilot program during a minor election or 
perform significant testing in a limited rollout, before deploying a new 
election technology on a broader scope and scale. 
• With regard to public-facing technology used in elections (e.g., electronic 
pollbooks), budgeting should include sufficient funds to allow for a 
publicly accessible copy to be on display before election day, staffed by a 
trained poll worker or staff member for demonstration purposes and 
questions. Alternatively, an open house for that piece of equipment should 
be held for the public to familiarize voters with its purpose and use. 
• If the former recommendation is not feasible, a video should be created 
that accomplishes the same goal, along with a plan for broadly distributing 
that video to the public before the first election in which a specific 
technology is to be used. 
• Regarding public-facing technology used in elections, poll workers should 
a) receive a thorough explanation of the technology’s role in the 
voting process, b) have time to adequately familiarize themselves with 
the use of the technology, and c) be prepared to guide voters in its use. 
In a case where these three recommendations cannot be met, election 
administrators should delay the deployment of the technology. 
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• Any public-facing technology used in elections by a poll worker or whose 
use will be explained to a voter by a poll worker should be made 
available in appropriate numbers such that each poll worker has 
individual access to an unshared machine, for hands-on poll-worker 
familiarization. This familiarization and hands-on contact should be 
outside of regular and required training hours and for a sufficient duration 
to allow poll workers to become familiar enough with the equipment to 
explain its use confidently to a voter. 
• Both state and local jurisdictions should begin the practice of keeping a 
record or journal of the unexpected issues that come up during an election 
day, along with the process used to resolve the issue. This journal can be 
used to gain insight on what events may occur more than believed, and can 
be used for training material in how to (or how not to) approach similar 
situations as a lessons-learned debrief in the future. 
• All poll-worker training should include a means of testing for 
comprehension and subsequent re-testing for retention in later cycles. 
• With regard to poll-worker identification, formal nametags that include the 
poll workers’ years of experience should be prepared. 
• Given the civic-duty nature of poll workers and their willingness and 
desire for advanced or additional training, advanced courses or 
additional materials should be created that can be passed by 
assessment, gaining the poll worker additional credentials, certifications, 
or merit-badge-style acknowledgments.190 
• If the two previous recommendations are implemented, the name tag and 
the merit badges should merge, as a form of gamification of the 
training process, with a public-facing explanation of the marks used on 
 
190 A merit badge could be any tokenized form of visual identification and distinction, from a pin to a 
patch to a simple sticker or color, that designates a specific achievement or collection of achievements. 
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the tags (e.g., orange circle for pollbook expert, yellow circle for 
registration expert, and red circle for expert in spoiling ballots).  
By implementing even one of these specific poll-worker recommendations, such as 
testing for comprehension, state and local jurisdictions will begin the process of improving 
the way they equip poll workers. As shown in Figure 11, poll-worker training leaves the 
largest footprint on the overall voter experience and likely yields the most significant initial 
returns on investment of time, effort, and dollars. By increasing the scope of 
implementation to include the technology recommendations and leveraging parallel 
content creation for voter education and poll-worker training, the positive impact will be 
felt by even more of the voting population. 
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Figure 11. Footprints of Training Impacts on Voter Confidence191 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
While many questions were asked and answered in the development of this work, 
many questions require further investigation or, to this author’s knowledge, have yet to be 
considered. For example, a more thorough investigation into the impact of a voter’s lack 
of understanding about a process on one’s confidence could prove worthwhile. Likewise, 
given the federalization of elections in the United States and the diversity of approaches 
used to administer elections, not only at the state level but also locally, this author would 
 
191 Figure 11 is the author’s creation, with approximated voter and poll worker populations based on 
the following 2020 election participation statistics and commonly published data: “The Data around How 
Many Poll Workers We Need in 2020,” Democracy Works (blog), August 3, 2020, https://www.democracy.
works/blog/2020/8/3/the-data-around-how-many-poll-workers-we-need-in-2020; Election Assistance 
Commission, Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report (Washington, DC: 
Election Assistance Commission, 2021), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/
2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf; “Election Workers Needed,” MIT Election Lab and Democracy 
Works, accessed September 15, 2021, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1pkW4zeJ84BzLkVpapz
Qqj4X0VkuR-Vr4EKUkOfryRYw/edit#gid=624597481. The concepts illustrated in Figure 11 were 
derived from Claassen et al., “‘At Your Service’”; and Burden and Milyo, “The Quantities and Qualities of 
Poll Workers.” 
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be interested in understanding the impacts of 2020s extensive de-urbanization and 
relocation on elector confidence as voters move across state lines and into new systems 
they likely do not understand, hindered by misconceptions of how it was done where they 
most recently lived. 
Another topic of interest would be within the space of gamification, specifically 
whether a model or collection of models would prove fruitful in countering the erosion of 
voter confidence in the election process. As with the merit-badge recommendation, a form 
of gamification, another intriguing suggestion came up in the focus group: to create a type 
of “choose your own ending book” experience in a game format, where a poll worker could 
face various scenarios or issues and select from a list of possible paths forward, to either 
one’s demise or the voter’s successful casting of a ballot. As such, gamification within the 
voting space and as a means of poll-worker training is an area ripe for exploration. 
Finally, the 2020 post-election unrest saw another significant new development in 
the election space, as state election officials began receiving death threats for their role in 
the election or their perceived failure to perform their role. While this has resulted in an 
entirely new homeland security challenge, it was almost five months after the election 
before the Department of Justice declared a task force to combat threats against election 
workers. Having reached beyond the officials and now landing at the doorsteps of even 
common poll workers, it is yet to be seen whether this threatening environment will have 
future implications in the recruiting of poll workers and their subsequent service in 
administering the elections of the United States. 
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